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Abstract
The Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA) is a piece of federal legislation that was
passed in 2004. The province of Quebec issued a reference question regarding the
constitutionality of the federal legislation and in 2010 the Supreme Court of Canada
rendered its opinion. The result was a success for the provinces because the Supreme
Court’s verdict severely limited the scope of the federal legislation. In addition to
clarifying the limits of the federal government’s criminal law power, the saga of the
AHRA also helps illustrate the integral role the concept of co-operative federalism plays
in modern Canadian inter-governmental relations. The nature and extent of the role
played by co-operative federalism will be determined through an examination of 1) the
history of co-operative federalism in Canada; 2) a discussion concerning co-operative
federalism as a concept; 3) an examination of competitive federalism, the central
opposing theory to co-operative federalism; 4) the development and implementation of
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act; 5) the events that occurred prior to, during, and
after the Supreme Court ruling in 2010, and critical commentary on that decision; and 6)
the potential implications that the Supreme Court opinion may have on future federalism
disputes in Canada.
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1. Introduction
Canada is a large and geographically diverse country with a multi-cultural
population that is constantly seeking to define its national identity. The tensions that exist
within the Canadian Federation are fuelled by various linguistic, cultural and regional
concerns. Due to the great size of the country the nation utilizes a variation of the federal
system of government where legislative powers and responsibilities are divided amongst
the central government and numerous provincial governments. Interactions between both
levels of government are common in Canada. A specific relationship that has garnered
significant attention is the one that exists between the federal government of Canada and
the provincial government of Quebec. The province of Quebec has long maintained that
the linguistic, cultural and legal structures that exist within its borders are unique in
comparison to the other provinces, and these structures have been the source of constant
inter-governmental tensions. As a result, Quebec has occupied a central place in the
Canadian federalist narrative.
That said, inter-governmental relationships in Canada have undergone drastic
changes since Canada became a nation in 1867. From 1867 to 1930 inter-governmental
relations in Canada were characterized as operating like ‘water-tight compartments’
where each individual governmental branch attended to its own business. This framework
continued to operate until the beginning of the Great Depression and with the events
leading up to World War II. The changing economic conditions and evolving demands of
a modern Canadian state proved to be too demanding for each governmental jurisdiction
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to operate in isolation from one another. Thus, in an effort to combat the strains of a
growing nation Canadian governments began to interact with one another and more
specifically, began to employ a concept known as co-operative federalism. Co-operative
federalism is essentially a network of relationships that exist between different levels of
government. These relationships are initiated and maintained by various political actors
of the central and regional governments.1 Through these relationships mechanisms are
developed that allow for the continuous redistribution of powers and resources without
seeking a remedy from the courts or the amending process.2
This project has six main sections. The first section of this project will be largely
historical, and will consist in a review of the unique circumstances surrounding the
formation of the Canadian Federation and analyze the influence of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, the legal institution that played a significant role in
moulding early Canadian inter-governmental relations. In addition, the section will
examine the status and defining characteristics of Canadian inter-governmental affairs
before the Great Depression, and conclude with the events that triggered the shift from
classical federalism to co-operative federalism.
The second section will be devoted to formally introducing the concept of cooperative federalism and discussing the views of three leading scholars whose
perspectives assist in articulating what co-operative federalism is and the role that the
concept has played in modern Canadian politics. The final portion of this section will be
dedicated to briefly examining the writings of contemporary scholars regarding co1

Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: 2012 Student Edition, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at
5-46.
2
Ibid.
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operative federalism in an effort to solidify that the concept and its resulting mechanisms
have endured and have become permanent fixtures in the landscape of Canadian intergovernmental relations.
Section three of this project will introduce and discuss the concept known as
competitive federalism, the central opposing outlook to co-operative federalism. Once the
competitive model of federalism has been considered, both of the concepts will be
compared and contrasted to one another. Key similarities and differences will be
uncovered to demonstrate the uses of both concepts and to clarify that co-operative
federalism is the best alternative to judicial review.
To adequately illustrate the uses of co-operative federalism the saga of a contested
piece of federal legislation called the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004),3 will be
examined. In particular section four will centre upon the genesis of the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act including an analysis of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies,4 the drafting of the legislation, and a brief overview of the provisions
contained within the Act. Once the provisions of the Act have been outlined general
observations pertaining to the legislation will be highlighted along with a short
examination of the legislative landscape prior to the creation of the Act.
The fifth section of this paper will explore the saga of litigation that occurred as a
result of the Government of Quebec issuing a reference question to the Quebec Court of
Appeal regarding the constitutionality of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act. A
3

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ESC 2004, c 2.
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1993) [Proceed
with Care].
4
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concise summary of the jurisprudence related to the federal government’s criminal law
power and the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights will be provided in
order to comprehend the legal arguments put forth in the Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act (2010)5. Also, the three opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada will
be explored followed by a critical commentary on the reference case, which will include
the views of legal scholars in relation to the reference opinion.
The final section will be dedicated to discussing the potential implications of the
majority opinion in the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act and presenting
concluding thoughts pertaining to the possible effects co-operative federalism can have
on the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, subsequent Canadian policy initiatives and
future constitutional disputes.
Overall, the objective of this thesis is to examine co-operative federalism as the
ideal alternative to judicial review, one that appeals to the idea that the judiciary should
only be considered as a ‘fail-safe’ mechanism for governments, if prolonged intergovernmental negotiations are unsuccessful. In particular, I will defend the proposition
that greater inter-governmental negotiation and consultation concerning the creation of
policy, especially complex policy with constitutional implications, will result in
legislation that is less likely to be challenged in the judiciary. In other words, cooperative federalism will be presented and defended as the best way to manage intergovernmental tensions in the Canadian federation as it is currently structured.

5

Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457.
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2. Historical Background
2.1 Canada Before the Great Depression
To begin, a brief introduction to the history and development of co-operative
federalism is necessary. There were a series of factors that assisted in the negotiating,
drafting and signing of the British North America Act, 1867.6 By 1864 it was clear that
the industrial North in the United States had won the American Civil War and would
consolidate the Southern states back into the American union.7 Due to the strained
diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States, the Canadian colonies now
had a very unfriendly and powerful opponent to the south. Before these events Britain
was against the idea of Canadian Confederation but in order to secure a strong military
base within its remaining colonies in North America, the British government was forced
to change its position.8 Within Canada, each eventual participant in Confederation had
their own concerns about federalism, but in the end they accepted that forming a
federation would create stability. It was the intention of the original drafters of the
Canadian Constitution to have the numerous provincial governments bound by a strong
central governmental branch. The newly created central government would handle
matters of national concern while the provincial governments would possess the powers
required to effectively manage local and regional matters. Along with national security,
trade was of particular importance to the economic state of all the colonies that would

6

Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3.
Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2004) at 24.
8
Ibid at 26.
7
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comprise Canada in 1867. The idea that there would be no tariffs applied to interprovincial Canadian trade was extremely appealing, particularly because the United
States had terminated a long standing reciprocal trade agreement with the Canadian
British colonies in 1866.9 Nevertheless, Canada was formed into a sovereign nation due
to the various colonies entering into the agreement known as the British North America
Act (BNA Act), subsequently referred to as Constitution Act, 1867 after 1982, which
culminated in Confederation in 1867.
The unique society and culture that had been fighting for survival within the
borders of Quebec ever since the Conquest of 1759 was the driving force in negotiations
leading up to the formation of the Canadian Federation in 1867. As noted by Stevenson,
“The demands for provincial legislative powers came mainly from the French Canadians,
for whom the establishment of a Quebec legislature was the major attraction of
Confederation.”10 The powers that Quebec wanted control over were related to education,
the legal system, and the family. Even the prominent provincial jurisdiction of ‘property
and civil rights’, located in section 92 (13) of the BNA Act, 1867 that numerous
constitutional disputes have been decided upon was expressly designed to protect
Quebec’s distinctive legal system, “… by repeating a phrase first used in the Quebec Act
of 1774…”11 It was the demands of French Canada that significantly influenced how the
provincial and federal powers were going to be distributed in sections 91 and 92 of the
original British North America Act, 1867.

9

Stevenson, supra note 7 at 27.
Ibid at 29.
11
Ibid.

10

7

Canada’s first Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald had a particular version of
federalism in mind when he and his associates were negotiating and drafting the
Canadian Constitution. It was clear that Macdonald’s concept of federalism accepted that
provincial interests were important and legitimate. However, these provincial worries
were seen as less important than the national goals of the federal government.12
Macdonald also believed that provincial concerns were not represented exclusively by the
provincial governments. Seeing as the federal government represented all of the pressing
provincial matters it seemed obvious that both levels of government shared responsibility
in highlighting provincial issues.13 The federal government was responsible for ensuring
regional concerns were addressed so that in turn, the entire nation could flourish. The
implications of Macdonald’s perspectives are clear, the federal government represented
national interests as well as a portion of matters of particular provincial and local
importance. If this was true than provincial governments were only responsible for
matters of provincial and local nature that were not represented by the federal
government. While it seemed that Sir John A. Macdonald’s conception of federalism did
not consider both levels of government as equal, this notion disappeared when
constitutional disputes were brought to the attention of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council (JCPC).

2.2 The Influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
The institution that shaped the future of Canadian inter-governmental politics was
not an establishment based in Canada but rather one that operated out of England. The

12
13

Stevenson, supra note 7 at 35.
Ibid at 36.
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JCPC was the final court of appeal for Canada from 1867 until 1949.14 Due to the
existence of the JCPC, the creation of a Canadian “general court of appeal” was not seen
as a necessity and this explains why the Supreme Court of Canada was not created until
1875.15 The creation of the Supreme Court of Canada was fundamentally different from
the establishment of the Supreme Court in the United States. The Canadian Supreme
Court was created by the passing of an ordinary statute the Supreme Court Act, 1875,
unlike in the United States where the U.S. Supreme Court and its powers are entrenched
within the U.S. Constitution. Due to the presence of the JCPC, the final rulings over
federal-provincial disputes were not being determined by the Supreme Court of Canada.
As stated by Hausegger et al. “Even After 1875, it was possible to bypass the Supreme
Court and appeal directly… to the JCPC…”16 The Supreme Court of Canada did not
become Canada’s final court of appeal until 1949. Consequently, the subservient stature
of the Supreme Court of Canada before 1949 allowed for the JCPC to mould provincial
and federal relations into a form that was far different from the concept put forth by the
Fathers of Confederation.
The law lords that comprised the JCPC singlehandedly decentralized trends in
Canadian public life. This can be explained by highlighting that at this time British legal
practitioners subscribed to the view that “checks and balances” were beneficial to a
federal state.17 In essence the dominant legal outlook took seriously the significance of

14

Lori Hausegger et al. Canadian Courts: Law, Politics and Process (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
2009) at 56.
15
Stevenson, supra note 7 at 46.
16
Hausegger et al. supra note 14 at 56-57.
17
Dennis Baker, Not Quite Supreme: The Courts and Coordinate Constitutional Interpretation (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University press, 2010) at 65-66.

9

jurisdictional separation.18 This legal attitude was demonstrated by the JCPC when the
court provided a narrow interpretation of the “peace, order and good government” clause
that was found in the Constitution of 1867 and a more generous interpretation regarding
provincial jurisdiction over property and civil matters.19 As time passed, “…this literal…
understanding of legal formalities was displaced by a focus on empirical realities that
were simply not captured by descriptions of the formalities.”20 As Canadian political
culture matured into the 1900’s it was clear that essential institutional actors, such as
parties and cabinets, were never mentioned in constitutional documents. This is
interesting because many fundamental political actors within Canadian politics today are
not included in constitutional documents but are instead products of constitutional
convention. This speaks to the flexibility of Canadian federalism and is evidence that the
country does not operate exactly as described in the Canadian Constitution. This lends to
the legitimacy of co-operative federalism as an alternative to judicial review in disputes
concerning federalism because, although the Constitution Act, 1867 makes no mention of
inter-governmental co-operative structures, the Canadian state is capable of introducing
new constitutional concepts without express constitutional declarations. Furthermore,
inter-governmental relationships depend upon informal agreements which have no
foundation in the Constitution, statutes or conventions.21 One example of such
arrangements is first ministers’ conferences, which are conferences involving the
provincial Premiers and the federal Prime Minister. With the support of senior ministers

18

Baker, supra note 17 at 66.
Herman Bakvis et al. Contested Federalism: Certainty and Ambiguity in the Canadian Federation
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 31.
20
Baker, supra note 17 at 66.
21
Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-46.
19
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and officials, the First Ministers are in a position to make commitments on behalf of
government, including commitments that require legislative action.22

2.3 The Shift to Co-Operative Federalism
The structure of governmental politics and division of powers that was established
with the constitutional interpretation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
operated effectively until the first worldwide economic meltdown. The Great Depression
of the 1930’s tested the financial capabilities of all the provinces and exposed the fiscal
limitations of the provincial governments.23 Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett
attempted to introduce legislation that was inspired by the New Deal, which was a piece
of legislation implemented in the United States to combat the effects of the Depression.
Unfortunately a number of the measures were rejected by the JCPC because in its view
the contingencies went beyond the federal government’s jurisdiction.24 By 1938, the
Rowell-Sirois Commission25 was appointed to analyze the financial implications of the
Great Depression. The Commission recommended major changes to the current
distribution of powers and a greater centralization of fiscal power in Ottawa.26 The
official report of the Commission was not released until 1940 and when it was finally
unveiled it was vehemently opposed by the three most populated and richest provinces.27
However, it was clear that the provinces did not have the required financial resources to
counter-act the effects of a worldwide economic crisis.

22

Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-46.
Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 31.
24
Ibid.
25
Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report of the Royal Commission on DominionProvincial Relations, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1940) [Rowell-Sirois Report].
26
Ibid at 32.
27
Ibid.
23
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The beginning of the Second World War and the re-introduction of a wartime
economy initiated the construction of the Canadian social welfare state. A period of
federal dominance during the World War II introduced the era of co-operative federalism.
Co-operative federalism was a system of relationships amongst the governmental leaders
of the federal and provincial governments.28 Utilizing co-operative federalism, “fiscally
and politically strong provincial governments and a national government armed with a
potent spending power created social programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction…”29
Some of the new social programs related to healthcare, post-secondary education, and
social assistance.30 The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was one of the social programs that
flawlessly sourced the tenets of co-operative federalism and produced a framework that
continues to benefit all Canadians. Throughout the process of creating the CPP the two
orders of government worked in such an intimate fashion to construct the agreement, that
the final version included a provision that required a specified number of provincial
governments as well as Ottawa to approve any future changes to the CPP.31
Additionally, after the war Ottawa took control over a number of tax fields and it
became evident that there was a need to improve linkages between the east and the west.
Two examples of such linkages include the construction of the Trans- Canada highway
and the creation of natural gas and oil pipelines from western Canada to supply central
Canadian markets.32 Finally, the social and economic devastation of the Great Depression
served as the primary motivation to create the national social safety net. The areas
28

Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-46.
Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, Canadian Federalism, 3d ed (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
2012) at 6.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid at 32.
32
Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 32.
29
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required to create an effective welfare system were largely within provincial jurisdiction
but it was evident that Ottawa had the motivation and the necessary monetary resources
to implement the framework successfully.33 The federal government needed the
assistance of the provinces seeing as they were responsible for health and welfare
matters. It was from this point forward that new relationships emerged between the
provincial and federal government. New consultative structures developed between the
elected officials of both levels of government and these structures have remained in place
ever since.34 The emergence of co-operative federalism was facilitated by various
Supreme Court verdicts that made it possible for one level of government to wilfully
delegate an authority to an agency of another order of government.35 An example of such
an agency is the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA).36 The legislative package
that created CEMA constituted a solution worked out, through federal-provincial cooperation, to address the problems of regulating the marketing of agricultural products.37
The legislation and companion agreement signed by the federal government and all ten
provincial governments, established a comprehensive program for the regulation and
marketing of eggs in Canada.38 Finally, the co-operative nature of Canadian federalism
was enhanced when beginning in the 1920’s the Supreme Court began to provide a more
liberal interpretation of ‘peace, order and good government’.39 The peace, order and good
government clause in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 was interpreted as enabling

33

Jennifer Smith, Federalism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) at 22.
Ibid.
35
Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 33.
36
Patrick Macklem & Carol Rogerson, eds, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications Limited, 2010) at 365.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 33.
34
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Ottawa to enact legislation that might otherwise come within provincial jurisdiction.40 As
established in Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press (1923)41 and
subsequently in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider (1925),42 it can do so
temporarily and quite extensively in order to respond to emergency situations.43 Also,
Parliament has the authority to justify permanent legislation in circumstances involving
provincial authority if the matter has attained a sufficient ‘national concern’ or ‘national
dimension’ such as aeronautics and the national capital region.44 Overall, the post-war era
marked the end of an age that was characterized by the jurisdictions of the provinces and
federal government as being separated like water-tight compartments.

3. Co-Operative Federalism
The creation of the federal system in Canada was a political compromise between
proponents of national unity and proponents of diversity.45 In a country that spans such a
vast territory it is appropriate to have a federal governmental system in place. However,
due to the distinct regional identities that exist across the country it would be difficult for
the federal government to efficiently operate and adequately represent countless concerns
at the provincial and local levels. Therefore the federal shape of Canada dictates that the
national government is responsible for all matters of national importance and that the

40

Dave Snow & Rainer Knopff, “Assisted Reproduction Policy in Federal States: What Canada Should
Learn from Australia” (2012) 5 University of Calgary: The School of Public Policy, SPP Research Papers 1
at 7.
41
Fort Frances Pulp & Paper v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] AC 695.
42
Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] AC 396.
43
Ibid.
44
Hogg, supra note 1 at 17-31.
45
Ibid at 5-14.
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provincial governments ensure that matters of local importance are safeguarded.46
Essentially, “… the federal imperative is that territorially-bounded interests be given a
strong influence in the governmental process.”47
Due to the federal composition of the Canadian state, different levels of
government exist to represent and protect particular interests. The period in Canadian
governmental history prior to World War II is characterized as a time when different
levels of Canadian government behaved like ‘watertight compartments’.48 This
‘watertight compartment’ notion of federalism views each branch of government as
operating on its own and rarely over-lapping with another level of government.49
According to academics like Peter W. Hogg, Donald V. Smiley, W.R. Lederman, Richard
Simeon, Ian Robinson and Ronald L. Watts, this type of governmental behaviour went
against the fundamental goals of the Canadian federal system. Smiley explains that “The
constitutional distribution of powers between Parliament and the provinces underlies a
situation in which the two orders of government are highly interdependent…”50 Since the
Constitution bestows explicit powers upon particular levels of government, it is necessary
for the provincial and federal governments to interact. Scholars advocating for the
existence of effective Canadian federalism state that “… a continuous process of federalprovincial consultation and negotiation is at the heart of the Canadian federal system.”51
It is critical that co-operative relationships exist between various governmental

46

Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-14.1.
Donald V. Smiley. The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 84
[Smiley, “Federal Condition”].
48
Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 6.
49
Ibid.
50
Smiley, “Federal Condition”, supra note 47 at 85-86.
51
Ibid at 86.
47
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components of the Canadian legislative structure to ensure that the system operates
smoothly and efficiently while minimizing inter-governmental tensions.
The formal structure of the Canadian Constitution suggests that eleven legislative
bodies are confined to separate jurisdictions and that each of these entities act
independently of the others.52 In addition, the Constitution does not take into account the
political implications of the three territorial governments, along with the influence of the
numerous Aboriginals bands that still exist today. Nevertheless, in many fields effective
policies require joint actions between numerous legislative bodies. The reality of the
modern Canadian Federation is that all levels of government are interdependent. As Peter
W. Hogg explains, “The related demands of interdependence of governmental policies,
equalization of regional disparities, and constitutional adaptation have combined to
produce what is generally described as “cooperative federalism”.”53 Co-operative
federalism is described as a system of relationships between various political actors that
allow for the continuous reallocation of responsibilities and resources without appeals to
the courts or a need to utilize the amending process.54 These relationships encourage
consultations to occur on issues that are important to the federal and provincial
governments.55 It is essential that these relationships remain as they assist in the
development of policies and agreements that are beneficial for all Canadians.
The creation of the Canadian Federation was the result of an agreement of mutual
consent between parties that supported both unification and diversity. Tensions are
52

Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-45.
W.R. Lederman, “Some Forms and Limitations of Co-Operative Federalism” in W.R. Lederman, ed,
Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas: Essays on the Constitutional History, Public Law and
Federal System of Canada (Toronto: Butterworth, 1981) at 315.
54
Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-45, 5-46.
55
Lederman, supra note 53 at 315.

53
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inherent within any federal system because the powers of government are distributed
between a national government and other local governmental bodies. However, one of the
distinct advantages of having a federal system in place is that this type of governmental
organization is highly adaptable. When the Canadian Federation was formed in 1867, it
was common for disputes related to jurisdiction to be brought to the attention of the
judiciary. There was little consultation and negotiation occurring between the federal
government and the provincial governments. This era of inter-governmental relations in
Canada between 1867 and 1930 has often been described as a time when governments
acted like ‘watertight compartments’. Prior to 1930, very little had been written on the
subject of Canadian federalism.56 As the Great Depression continued to affect the
economic stability of the country, it was clear that the current operation of Canadian
federalism had been inadequate in meeting the demands of the Canadian population.57
Both levels of government could no longer afford to bicker amongst one another and wait
for the courts to render decisions concerning jurisdiction and the allocation of resources.
The governmental bodies in Canada needed to establish a new framework that would
solve inter-governmental disputes, without litigation within the courts and without the
pursuit of constitutional amendment. To address the pressing concerns of the country,
Canadian legislatures began to employ the concept of co-operative federalism. In what
follows the views of constitutional law experts Peter W. Hogg, W.R. Lederman and
Donald V. Smiley will be considered to illustrate the important role that co-operative
federalism plays in the modern Canadian Federation. Above all, co-operative federalism
will be discussed as the best alternative to judicial review particularly in cases concerning
56

Donald V. Smiley, Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer for Canada, 1970) at 84 [Smiley, “Constitutional”].
57
Ibid at 85.
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federalism, and that the judiciary should only be involved if extended inter-governmental
relations fail to provide a viable solution.

3.1 The End of the Classical Federalism Era
The structure of Canadian governmental institutions and the division of powers
that occurred with the judicial opinions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
lasted until the beginning of the first stock market crash in 1929. The Great Depression of
the 1930’s revealed that the provinces could not mitigate the effects of this crisis alone.58
Canadian Prime Minister R.B. Bennett attempted to pass federal regulations that would
combat the economic conditions. Unfortunately, the proposed legislation did not survive
the scrutiny of the JCPC and the established division of powers.59 The failure of Prime
Minister Bennett’s legislation led many to believe that the Canadian Constitution did not
allow the federal government to adequately address the issues of the day.60
In response, the federal government appointed the Royal Commission on
Dominion-Provincial Relations in 1938.61 The Commission, also known as the RowellSirois Report, “… published in 1940, constitutes, along with the specialized studies
undertaken at the direction of the Commission, the most comprehensive study of a
working federal system that has ever been made.”62 The Commission was ordered to
analyze the current state of federalism in Canada and review the entire financial structure
of the federation. The final report recommended greater centralization of powers to the
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federal government and greater fiscal controls transferred to Ottawa.63 It was clear that
the report was highly critical of collaborative activities between the federal and provincial
governments. However, the Rowell-Sirois Report seriously underestimated the future
possibilities of federal-provincial co-operation.64
Overall, the post-war era marked the end of the age of ‘classical federalism’. This
‘classical federalism’ period has been described by academics as a time when the
jurisdictions of the provinces and federal government were completely separated as if
each jurisdiction was a ‘water-tight compartment.’ Canadian constitutional scholar Peter
H. Russell observed that:
“This so-called “co-operative federalism” of the post-war period has been much
less a litigious struggle between Ottawa and the provinces to defend and expand
their own enclaves of power than a matter of political compromise and
administrative pragmatism.”65
This concludes my discussion of the genesis of the concept of co-operative
federalism. The next portion of this project will be dedicated to introducing the views of
three Canadian constitutional law scholars who define what co-operative federalism is,
and articulate the impact the concept has had on modern Canadian inter-governmental
relations. It is important to consider the perspectives of these scholars especially when
one is attempting to understand what co-operative federalism is and how the model
applies to actual legal and political situations.
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3.2 Peter W. Hogg and Co-Operative Federalism
Since the mid 1940’s co-operative federalism has been a concept utilized by
Canadian governmental institutions. Canadian constitutional law expert Peter W. Hogg
has written about the countless benefits of co-operative federalism within the context of
the Canadian Federation. Hogg explains that the formal structure of the Constitution
seems to describe the existence of eleven separate legislative bodies that operate
independently of one another.66 In certain fields this is exactly what happens. However,
mechanisms such as equalization grants demonstrate that this is not always the case. For
example, the equalization grants were created to account for regional economic
disparities. The prosperous provinces are required to assist the poorer provinces in order
to help maintain a minimum national average for public services across the country.67
Over time, changing conditions require the federal system to evolve and adapt in
order to survive.68 For a federation to keep pace with the shifting values and expectations
of modern society it is necessary to modify the Constitution. Constitutional adaptation
can occur through the courts, constitutional amendment or inter-governmental cooperation.69 First, change through recourse to the courts is time consuming and
incremental. The courts can only render decisions based upon the cases that come to the
attention of the judiciary. Also, it is recognized that there is a significant delay between
when cases reach the bench of the Supreme Court and when the Court releases a decision.
Next, adaptation within the federal system does not ordinarily occur through
constitutional amendment, as this process is highly demanding and lengthy. The
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amending process instituted by the Constitution Act, 1982 “…require(s) such a broad
consensus for most amendments that they cannot be a regular form of adaptation.”70
Hogg concludes that since adaptation through the courts is incremental and constitutional
amendment is extremely demanding, the efficient operation of the modern Canadian state
demands a significant degree of co-operation. Examples of co-operation between
governments include interdependence of government policies, equalization of regional
disparities and constitutional adaptation. In Canadian academic literature, co-operation
between governments has been identified as co-operative federalism.
The essence of co-operative federalism is a network of relationships that exist
between various executives and public representatives of the central and provincial
governments.71 Through these relationships mechanisms are created, “…which allow a
continuous redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts or the
amending process.”72 Most inter-governmental relationships depend on informal
arrangements between different governmental bodies. These informal measures have no
basis in the Constitution, statutes or constitutional convention.73 There are numerous
federal-provincial committees of ministers that meet on occasion.74 Similarly, there are
frequent meetings between bureaucratic officials of both levels of government and
countless organizations, committees and conferences involved in the inter-governmental
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liaison.75 It is clear that vast arrays of consultative organisms are operating within the
Canadian Federation.76

3.3 W.R. Lederman’s View of Co-operative Federalism
Canadian constitutional scholar W.R. Lederman wrote extensively on issues
related to the Canadian Constitution. Lederman wrote that all federal systems must
employ co-operative federalism to some degree.77 He observed that in Canada, there is
the increasing need for agreements and understandings between the federal and
provincial governments. For both levels of government to operate efficiently it is
important for there to be clarification concerning specified uses of respective powers and
resources.78 These agreements and understandings take many forms, operate in many
ways and occur at every official level. Co-operation within the Canadian governmental
system is ongoing and occurs on a regular basis.
It is clear that these consultations are not simply a measure of good will and that
hard bargaining is expected. Such negotiations occur within the framework provided by
the federal Constitution. The Constitution is important because it provides the initial
definition of which powers and resources are to be wielded by both levels of government.
Essentially, the Constitution provides the framework of how co-operative measures
between governments in Canada will be undertaken.79 Lederman stresses that the courts
play an important role in the operation of co-operative federalism. Interpretations of the
Constitution that are supplied by the judiciary are important because it is these
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explanations that inform the jurisdictional underpinnings of the Canadian federal system.
The bargaining position of each respective level of government is determined by legal
interpretation.80
The federal system of government divides legislative powers amongst different
levels of government. However, the federal government and the provinces are responsible
for the same population living in the same territory. Thus, this division of power implies
a certain level of government interdependence.81 Both governments have a joint
responsibility to the same territory and the same people but are limited to a specific list of
powers. In the Canadian context inter-governmental co-operative measures are desirable
because, both the federal and provincial legislatures need to respond to the wishes of the
same electoral bodies residing in the same territory.82 If the federal and provincial lists of
power were clear, complete and mutually exclusive in all circumstances, then there would
be no need for co-operative federalism.83 The employment of co-operative federalism is
a necessity in Canada today. In modern Canadian society, statutes have become more
complicated and multi-faceted. The more complex a statute, the greater need there is for
inter-governmental collaboration.
In sum, Lederman demonstrates that the federal and provincial governments are
constantly involved with one and another. Based on the division of powers stipulated in
the Constitution governments in Canada have always been dependent. Inter-governmental
conferences, committees and meetings are a permanent fixture of modern Canadian
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federalism.84 Lederman explained that the presence of wide-ranging co-operative activity
is a sign of health and vitality within the Canadian federal system.85 Moreover, cooperative federalism contains elements of efficiency and flexibility that will allow the
Canadian Federation to adapt and change over time.86 The widespread use of the concept
has demonstrated that co-operative federalism allows governments to address the
changing needs of Canadian society with far greater effectiveness, as opposed to if the
legislatures appealed to the courts or constitutional amendment.

3.4 Donald V. Smiley and Co-Operative Federalism
Canada’s premier federalism scholar Donald V. Smiley has published numerous
works pertaining to the history and development of the Canadian Federation. Smiley
stated that the goal of any federal system is to safeguard regional interests and to ensure
that these interests are given strong influence in the governmental process.87 Due to the
presence of a federal system in Canada, “… the constitutional distribution of
powers…underlies a situation in which the two orders of government are highly
interdependent but are not directly related to one another…”88 For Smiley, a continuous
process of federal-provincial consultation and negotiation is at the very heart of the
Canadian federal system.89
Within the academic community, co-operative federalism has been described as
an effective mechanism for creating arrangements between governments that are
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beneficial to all Canadians. Smiley emphasized collaboration between governments as
opposed to ‘classical federalism’, where each level of government fulfilled constitutional
duties in relative isolation from one another.90 As Canada’s foremost student in the field
of federalism, Smiley sought to describe the features that embody the concept of cooperative federalism. First, co-operative federalism envisages an increasingly more
institutionalized framework for inter-governmental relations. These structures would
encourage regular meetings between government officials and greater transparency
regarding the activities performed during these consultations.91 Second, co-operative
federalism involves interactions between the federal and provincial governments
concerning the most fundamental aspects of public policy.92 With the increasing
complexity of modern legislation, co-ordination and consultation between governments is
essential to ensure tensions within the federation are at a minimum. Furthermore, in areas
that could have not been foreseen at the time of Confederation, such as environmental
law and advances in health technology, collaboration is necessary because the
Constitution is silent concerning these emerging fields. The third feature is directly
related to the second. Co-operative federalism endorses consultation between
governments prior to the commitment to new policies that may infringe on the
jurisdiction of the other.93 It was not uncommon for the federal government to act
unilaterally in areas related to provincial jurisdiction shortly after the Second World
War.94 The 1950’s were considered to be the height of this aforementioned federal
dominance. However, co-operative federalism precludes any unilateral legislative
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action.95 The Quebec Premier Jean Lesage at the Federal-Provincial Conference stressed
this understanding in July 1965 when he stated:
“Sound practice of federalism requires that each government respect the
jurisdiction of the other legislative authorities. In an era when interdependence is
as pronounced as it is today…even when legislating in fields within its own
jurisdiction, each government should be concerned with the repercussions of its
decisions on the others’ plans and the orderly conduct of the country’s affairs in
general.”96
The final feature of co-operative federalism is the most crucial to the successful
application of the concept. The way in which governments continuously redistribute
powers, responsibilities and resources amongst one another is through constant
interaction between the federal and provincial government rather than constitutional
amendment or changing patterns of judicial review.97 The Honourable Guy Favreau
accurately described the new circumstances surrounding post-war Canadian federalism
when he stated, “Gone are the days when constant recourse to the courts was hurriedly
made to obtain an interpretation that would finally resolve jurisdictional conflicts
between the federal and provincial governments.”98 Most of the basic conflicts between
the two levels no longer require the involvement of the judiciary. Constitutional
amendment is demanding and changes to constitutional documents simply delineate
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powers and privileges rather than articulating specific activities.99 Under the prevailing
attitudes it would be regarded as inappropriate for the governments to submit a dispute of
fundamental importance to the judiciary unless extensive inter-governmental negotiations
had failed to result in an agreement.100

3.5 Other Contemporary Thoughts on Co-Operative Federalism
Recent writings on the concept suggest that co-operative federalism has had a
profound impact on Canadian governance. There is a general consensus within the
academic community that “well-performing federal institutions… [are] conducive to
negotiation, consultation, or simply an exchange of information.”101 Given the changing
policy environment and continually shifting agendas, governments need to interact with
one another and communicate to adjust their respective roles. 102 In a federal system,
producing results for the population means reaching agreements on a variety of issues. In
general, “Canadians have no deep commitment to the principle of federalism, have little
knowledge of the existing division of powers, and care little about which government
exercises which power.”103 Nevertheless, Canadians care about results and they view cooperation between governments as the best way to achieve this.104 As mentioned, the
development of negotiation and coordination between both levels of government
occurred after the conclusion of World War II. Together, the provinces and federal
government coordinated to create social programs within provincial jurisdiction that
would benefit all Canadians. Modern scholars have reported that co-operative federalism
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has evolved into a less hierarchical form since the 1990’s.105 The dedication to cooperative federalism has allowed Canada to become one of the world’s most
decentralized federations, with the federal and provincial governments relatively evenly
balanced in their power and status and at the same time highly inter-dependent.106
The influence that co-operative federalism has had on Canadian intergovernmental relations is undeniable. The writings of Peter W. Hogg, W.R. Lederman,
Donald V. Smiley and other more recent research clearly indicate that co-operative
federalism is an indispensable feature of a healthy Canadian federal system. The
utilization of the concept has demonstrated that co-operative federalism has allowed the
Canadian federation to survive and flourish. The defining characteristic of co-operative
federalism is for political and administrative processes to be the chief instruments of
change.107 The flexibility and efficiency of the modern Canadian state relies on the
existence of ongoing negotiation and collaboration between the federal and provincial
governments. Bringing disagreements to the attention of the courts should only be
considered as a ‘fail-safe’ mechanism in the rare event of an irreconcilable
misunderstanding between governments. The use of the judiciary as an absolute last
resort is widely accepted within the academic community. All collaborative resources
that are accessible within the modern inter-governmental framework must be exhausted
before a disagreement is brought to the attention of the judiciary.
The concept of co-operative federalism reflects the flexibility and efficient
operation of Canadian federalism. The ending of the classical federalism era
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demonstrated that Canadian federalism has the ability to adapt. No longer were
governments operating as if they were in seclusion from one another, the demands of a
mature Canada necessitated modifications. The introduction of co-operative federalism
laid the foundation for the current inter-governmental mechanisms that exist to this day.
The fact that contemporary political scientists and constitutional law scholars continue to
discuss the impact of the concept suggests that the concept is influential in the field of
inter-governmental relations. The continuous discussion of the concept in academic
literature indicates co-operative federalism is irreplaceable in the attempt to minimize
tensions within the Canadian Federation. Additionally, adhering to the tenets of cooperative federalism has the potential to not only decrease tensions but can also allow for
the creation of legislation that it is accepted by both the federal and provincial
governments.

4. Competitive Federalism
It is clear that in the mid-1930’s and following the conclusion of World War II,
federalism within the Canadian Federation adapted to the changing social and economic
concerns of 20th century Canada. According to leading Canadian constitutional scholars
the use of co-operative federalism resulted in increased co-ordination between
governments that allowed for the establishment of the Canadian welfare state.108
However, when performing an analysis concerning the effectiveness of co-operative
federalism it is important to consider differing perspectives. The central opposing theory
to the notion of co-operative federalism is a concept known as competitive federalism.

108

Bakvis & Skogstad, supra note 29 at 6.

29

Canadian economist Albert Breton first postulated the formal theory of
competitive federalism. Breton wrote an article in early 1985 as a criticism of some
recommendations contained in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada.109 In the article, Breton outlined his
theory of competitive federalism that questioned the operation of co-operative federalism.
Breton began by highlighting that there was a tendency within the academic literature to
compare the Canadian federal system with the political infrastructures of the United
States and the United Kingdom. He explained that each of these modern nations operated
while utilizing distinct forms of political organization. For example, the United Kingdom
is a unitary-parliamentary state, the United States is a federal-congressional state and
Canada is a federal-parliamentary state.110 Unlike the federal states of Canada and the
United States, the United Kingdom does not have to worry about division of powers
disputes because of the unitary structure it employs. Breton made the distinction between
the three nations to emphasize that Canada was the first country to employ the federalparliamentary style of state organization. He explained that since then numerous federal
countries have chosen to incorporate Canada’s combination of the parliamentary and
federal systems.111
Although Canadian federalism had survived for almost 150 years, Breton
disagreed with how the system had evolved and adapted since the 1930’s. He stressed the
need for increased competition within the Canadian Federation and added that
competition would increase the effectiveness of federalism in Canada. In particular,
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Breton claimed that increased competition could be introduced by changing the Canadian
political system to include additional checks and balances.112 According to Breton, little
competition, or few checks and balances, exist within the parliamentary system of
government. In his view the checks and balances that are present within the Canadian
political system stem from powerful interests such as “…economic (like business and
labour, though these are not usually of equal strength), religious (churches), intellectual
(academics and research organizations), and so on.”113 Other checks and balances come
from Question Period in the House of Commons and more importantly, the competition
that originates from the political necessity to garner public support that is contested at
regular intervals.114 However, Breton was of the view that, overall inter-governmental
competition is rather weak, especially when the political party in power has obtained a
majority government.115
Breton explained that the shortage of checks and balances in the Canadian
political structure originated from the lack of separation between the executive and
legislative branches.116 According to renowned federalism scholar Ronald L. Watts:
“The most innovative feature of the [Canadian] federation was that, in contrast to
the U.S. and Swiss federations, which emphasized the separation of the executive
and legislature in their federal institutions, Canada was the first federation to
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incorporate a system of parliamentary responsible government in which the
executive and the legislature are fused.”117
With decreased checks and balances the aspirations and opinions of the public are not
likely to be richly represented, as they would be in a system with a larger amount of
competition.118 Breton stressed that the solution lied in the proven adaptability of
Canadian federalism. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada presented recommendations that had the potential of
improving inter-governmental competition, such as making suggestions pertaining to
Senate reform. Breton sought to go one step further when he suggested, “… serious
consideration should be given to finding ways of reducing party discipline… for all
matters, except budgetary ones.”119 The logic behind this proposal was to increase the
power of individual elected representatives and in turn, enhance the minister’s capability
to voice the opinions of their constituents, which would improve a voter’s ability to
influence government.
The heart of Breton’s argument is steeped in the idea of Canadian intragovernmental competition. What Breton meant by ‘intra-governmental competition’ was
the competition that occurred between various political parties, the executive, the
legislature, the judiciary and bureaucracies.120 These various components of the Canadian
political system are constantly competing for popular support. In Breton’s view, popular
support is “… something that is as needed for the effectiveness of governing parties as
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revenue is essential for the effectiveness of business firms.”121 In other words, it is
essential for the effective operation of the Canadian Federation for various political
entities to compete with one another with the goal of maximizing public support.

4.1 Breton’s Criticism of Co-Operative Federalism
With this notion of competition in mind, Breton examined the effectiveness of cooperative federalism within the context of Canadian federalism. Breton stated that “it
must be recognized that co-operative federalism is aimed at removing the competition
which is a natural by-product of federal organization.”122 In some cases it is beneficial for
competitive relationships to remain in place, such as the adversarial relationship between
prosecutors and defense attorneys in a court of law, and the competitive nature of various
political parties vying for public support in electoral contests. These examples underline
that in some cases co-operation is a less efficient alternative to a competitive
environment. Breton was clear when he warned, “… co-operation can easily degenerate
into collusion, conspiracy and connivance and that this is not necessarily good!”123 The
collusion that Breton referred to was reflected in the operation of co-operative federalism,
which Breton declared was the same as executive federalism. Renowned Canadian
federalism scholar Donald V. Smiley defined executive federalism as, “… the relations
between elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government in federalprovincial interactions and among the executives of the provinces in interprovincial
actions.”124 The danger of executive federalism is that it relocated negotiations out of the
political realm and into the offices of the executive and the bureaucracy. When executive
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federalism and by extension co-operative federalism is viewed in such a fashion one
could come to the conclusion that, “The heart of co-operative federalism is secret deals,
not the stuff on which a lively democracy thrives!”125 In an attempt to limit the
subversive effects of co-operative federalism, Breton proposes a variety of solutions,
most notably that all federal-provincial consultation must take place in the debates that
follow discussions in the House of Commons and provincial parliaments and not in
closed meetings that precede parliamentary interactions.126
Two major concerns stemmed from the Canadian political system’s adherence to
the tenets of co-operative federalism. First, Breton warned that separatism would thrive
within a federation that utilizes co-operative federalism since federations are inherently
competitive. Given that the component parts that make up a federation are constantly
competing with one another, a co-operative framework would allow separatists to claim
that the entire system does not work.127 Breton maintained that if inter-governmental cooperation was suppressed the separatist argument would be weakened.
Second, co-operative federalism condemns unilateralism, which is the
independent action by one government of the federation.128 As indicated by Smiley, “…
cooperative federalism embodies consultations between the provinces and the federal
government prior to the latter committing itself to policies directly affecting provincial
interests.”129 Breton goes one step further by clarifying that proponents of co-operative
federalism condemn any unilateral action by either level of government. This particular
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principle of co-operative federalism drastically affects the activities of the federal
government and only minimally impedes policy objectives within provincial
jurisdiction.130 For example, in order for the provinces to act in unison there must be an
agreement that is reached between ten separate competitive entities. On the other hand,
the central government is far more likely to act unilaterally than the provinces seeing as
the federal government’s policy responsibilities have national implications and because
these obligations have a greater likelihood of imposing on provincial jurisdiction.
Therefore, by prohibiting unilateral governmental action co-operative federalism is
preventing the federal government from addressing issues it alone can resolve and is
constitutionally responsible for sorting out.131 Breton concludes by stipulating that a
denial of unilateralism equates to the rejection of the division of powers and federalism
itself and continuing to abide by the principles of co-operative federalism is akin to the
creation of a unitary state disguised within a federal system. 132
In essence, according to Breton it is of great necessity to foster a culture of
competition within the Canadian Federation in order to ensure the effective maintenance
of the Canadian democracy. The parliamentary system is characteristically less
competitive because it has far fewer checks and balances when compared to countries
that employ a congressional scheme.133 When likened to the congressional composition in
the United States, it is easier for laws to be passed within the confines of the Canadian
parliamentary system. When it is more difficult to pass legislation it demonstrates that
numerous obstacles are in place. For statutes to overcome various impediments political
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figures must discuss and debate on the matters to be legislated.134 Increased debate leads
to more involvement by politicians, lobbyists, bureaucrats, academics, writers and so on.
This enhanced system of checks and balances stimulates discussion in the public forum
and at the same time, heightening society’s demand for access to information and
decreasing secrecy within political institutions.135 With greater public involvement in the
legislative process the legitimacy of statutes is intensified. This newfound legitimacy
translates into valid legislation that is far less likely to be reversed or repealed even with
the inevitable change of governments.136
In sum, Breton maintains that a Canadian parliamentary system with greater
checks and balances would be beneficial to all Canadians and to the survival of Canadian
democracy. In contrast, co-operative federalism advances the idea that the establishment
and maintenance of consultative mechanisms will ensure the creation of accepted
legislation and limit the inter-governmental tensions that often result in constitutional
litigation.

4.2 Brief Comparison of Co-Operative Federalism and Competitive
Federalism
There is little doubt that the competitive dynamic is inherent within the Canadian
Federation as it is “… rooted in ideological diversity, genuine differences of interest
arising from differences in material/economic base and societal demands, and the
electoral imperative to gain credit and avoid blame.”137 Numerous provincial and national
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political parties are constantly jostling for position with voters, while attempting to
maximize autonomy and jurisdiction.138
Regardless of the competition that exists within the federation, inter-governmental
relations after the 1930’s have been characterized as an era of executive federalism,
where elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government constantly
interact.139 Breton warned that the shift away from ‘classical federalism’ would prove to
be detrimental to the effective function of Canadian federalism. This classical model was
prevalent prior to World War II and is described as a time when both levels of
government operated independently with little legislative overlap or inter-governmental
collaboration.140
The concept of co-operative federalism was introduced after the Second World
War when the federal government took the lead in establishing the foundations of the
modern welfare state.141 The federal government required the assistance of the provinces,
since matters like health and welfare are areas that fall within provincial jurisdiction.142
Over the years consultative structures were created that ensured constant communication
between elected officials and public servants of both orders of government. The
emergence of executive federalism has been viewed by the academic community as a
response to policy interdependence or, “…the overlap and duplication that are inevitable
with two activist orders of government.”143 Since the rise of the modern welfare state
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there have been very few policy areas in which either Ottawa or the provinces operate
without infringing on the jurisdiction of another government. Even the most
straightforward of policy initiatives may require collaboration between governments. In
the modern Canadian federation a government with the necessary authority to make a
decision must consider the implications for other governments.144
When referring to Donald V. Smiley’s definition of executive federalism, there is
no mention of the public being involved in inter-governmental negotiations. Breton
explained that the lack of public participation “spoils the promise of democratic openness
and responsiveness that is inherent in classical federalism.”145 Under classical federalism
it is possible for governments to compete for the affections of the masses. Furthermore,
when governments act purely on their own authority, as they do in classical federalism,
clear lines of accountability are drawn.146 Hence, it is less difficult for the public to
identify which level of government is responsible for each policy initiative.
Overall, Breton’s theory of competitive federalism contains valid points of
discussion. However, he believes that a competitive environment with checks and
balances is essential for the continuance of the parliamentary organization of
government.147 This notion comes from the idea that, just as competition produces
superior benefits in the open market by preventing market domination of monopolies and
oligopolies, society will be better served by governments moving within a competitive
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setting.148 Breton compares co-operative federalism to collusion directed at serving the
interests of political elites and not ordinary citizens.149 However, in an age of increasing
policy collaboration both domestically and internationally, it can be said that competitive
federalism will only result in minor solutions that only help particular provinces or
regions. Canadian federalism based on inter-governmental co-operation has demonstrated
the uncanny ability to evolve and adapt based on the current demands of the Canadian
Federation.
Up to this point this project has analyzed the historical roots of the Canadian
Federation to reveal that the country was founded by two groups of individuals, one
group that supported national unity and another that favoured regional diversity. Canada
was created through the utilization of the federal system of government to appease the
proponents of national cohesion and proponents of diversity. The signing of the original
British North America Act in 1867 would create numerous provinces held together by one
central governmental branch. The provinces and the federal government were each
designated areas of exclusive jurisdiction that were enforced by the constitutional
interpretation of the courts. The presence of a new federal system in Canada meant that
inter-governmental tension was guaranteed. Until 1930, the JCPC reinforced the era of
classical federalism, a time in Canada where each individual jurisdiction operated in
relative isolation from one another with little or no jurisdictional overlap. The Great
Depression, World War II and the establishment of the Supreme Court of Canada as
Canada’s final court of appeal in 1949, all led to the end of the classical federalism era
and assisted with the introduction of co-operative federalism. An extensive system of
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inter-governmental consultative structures were established in an effort to combat the
effects of the Great Depression and meet the societal demands of a modern Canada. The
concept of co-operative federalism was extremely attractive because it allowed for the
constant redistribution of powers and resources between governments without the
involvement of the judiciary or constitutional amendment. This allowed for both
governments to efficiently implement policy without extended delays.
The concept of competitive federalism as theorized by Albert Breton assumes that
greater checks and balances in the Canadian political system will result in better policy
initiatives. Still, it has been proposed that the tenets of co-operative federalism will create
superior legislation in a flexible and highly efficient manner and this will result in
decreased inter-governmental tensions.
However, in order to effectively assess the usefulness of co-operative federalism a
recent legislative saga will be examined. The next section of this thesis will therefore be
dedicated to analyzing the development of a piece of federal legislation known as the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004). Once the genesis of the Act has been examined
there will be a brief overview of the provisions contained within the legislation. Once that
section is complete the final portion of the project will be dedicated to providing a critical
commentary on the Supreme Court reference opinion entitled the Ref re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act (2010). The constitutional justifications utilized by both the federal
government and the provincial governments will be assessed. The opinions of the Court
will be discussed followed by various reactions from the academic community. It will be
proposed that the federal legislation did not survive constitutional scrutiny because the
tenets of co-operative federalism were not adhered to during the formulation of the Act.
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Finally, a discussion concerning the implications the reference opinion may have on
future constitutional disputes and assisted human reproductive technology will take place.
The logic behind analyzing all of these components is to show that the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act is a bad example of co-operative federalism and that if the tenets of the
concept were extensively utilized throughout the legislative process it would have been
less likely that constitutionality of the Act would have been challenged.

5. The Genesis of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
Canada along with the United States, Switzerland and Australia, is one of the first
major federal nations to exist worldwide. Canadians must contend with local and
municipal governments, provincial and territorial governments, Aboriginal governments
and the federal government. Jennifer Smith posits that “given the size of the country and
the heterogeneity of the population, [one might say] that it would hardly do to organize
the governing system any other way.”150 To account for the vast size and diversity of the
country the creation of a federation was the most suitable structure for Canada. However,
because Canada is a federation the diverse views that exist across the country will result
in a never-ending cycle of political and societal tension. This strain that is always
apparent in inter-governmental relations worsens when new controversial topics arise. In
2004 the federal government passed An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction
and Related Research.151 The Act, which would later be referred to as the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act (AHRA), was the culmination of fifteen years of research and
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policy development in a field that could not have been foreseen at the time of
Confederation.152

5.1 The Evolving Influence of Women in the 1980’s
In the early 1980’s the Canadian political forum underwent drastic alterations
following the successful patriation of the Canadian Constitution. At this time there was a
collective and highly focused campaign in which many women who were lawyers played
a significant role in the wording of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.153 This section of the Charter guaranteed equality rights by ensuring no one
would be discriminated against based on “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability…”154 The prominent role that women in a
variety of capacities had on the wording of this section affected political events for the
remainder of the decade. For instance, the legal recourse for those experiencing
discrimination encouraged the establishment of the Women’s Legal Education and
Action Fund.155 This powerful charitable organization ensured countless legal successes
that drastically impacted political discourse pertaining to women’s rights in Canada and
around the world.156 The most famous contribution of this group was their activities that
led to the implementation of equal pay for work of equal value in the public sector.157
Around the same time, women’s abortion rights were being questioned in the political
and legal arenas. The activities of Dr. Henry Morgentaler acted as the catalyst that
152
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prompted the abortion debate amongst lawyers and politicians. The arrest and
imprisonment of Dr. Morgentaler following the realization that he was operating illegal
abortion clinics solidified that the topic required Parliament’s attention.158 After the
highly publicized Supreme Court of Canada judgment and extensive political debates,
abortion was decriminalized in 1988.159

5.2 The Push For An Investigation Into Assisted Reproductive Technology
When the late 1980’s came around feminist activists, academics and health
advocates began pushing for a formal inquiry into new human reproductive technology in
Canada. This collection of individuals formed the Canadian Coalition for a Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies.160 The group chose to lobby for a
Royal Commission because of the favourable reception of the previous Royal
Commission on the Status of Women that took place between 1967 and 1971.161 The
coalition justified the need for biotechnology policy in Canada by emphasizing the social
and ethical implications of genetic technologies. This approach was vastly different from
the biotechnology policies in other countries that were considered in the interest of
economic policy. For example, in the United States private companies fund the vast
majority of medical research, and these are not subject to federal funding regulations.162
As a result, the approach of the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies ensured these social and ethical considerations would be
considered throughout the duration of the ensuing Royal Commission.

158

Jones & Salter, supra note 152 at 423.
Ibid.
160
Ibid.
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid at 426.

159

43

After a long lobbying campaign the efforts of the Coalition were successful when
in 1989 the Canadian government appointed the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies.163 Dr. Patricia Baird was selected as Chair of the
Commission and like many other Royal Commissions commonly known by the name of
the chair, the Baird Commission commenced in 1989.164 The commission was charged
with the mandate to:
“examine current and potential scientific and medical developments related to
reproductive technologies but also to go beyond them to consider: the impact of the
technologies on society as a whole; their impact on identified groups in society,
specifically women, children, and families; and the ethical, legal, social, economic,
and health implications of these technologies.”165
The Baird Commission was plagued with difficulties from the outset with the most
notable challenge being a severe lack of public feedback on the topic. Those who have
analyzed the processes utilized by the Royal Commission have been able to reveal a
variety of procedural flaws including the poor design of public hearings, and the presence
of an intimidating and dismissive hearing atmosphere.166 Furthermore, these glaring
inadequacies were most apparent when the Commission admitted to have knowingly
lacked input from “francophones, ethno-cultural groups, religious groups, and
aboriginals…”167 The Commission maintained that these sub-sections of the population
had no valid opinions to provide regarding the topic of assisted reproductive
163
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technologies.168 The issues uncovered by critics made it apparent that the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was not fully addressing its mandate,
especially with regards to examining the impact of biotechnology on vulnerable groups.
In 1991 four Commissioners publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the
exclusionary design of the Commission’s public participation component, its internal
politics and Dr. Patricia Baird’s fostering of an undemocratic internal structure.169
Finally, after a launching a lawsuit against the Commission, the four commissioners were
fired and the final report was released without four of its original members.170

5.3 The Commission’s Final Report: Proceed with Care
The procedural problems that occurred during the operation of the Baird
Commission led to a politically charged atmosphere when the completed report was
released to the public.171 The highly publicized objections of the four former
Commissioners only enhanced tensions. Nevertheless, the Commission released its final
report entitled Proceed with Care in 1993.172 Although it did not seem like it throughout
the term of the Commission, the final recommendations reflected the original objectives
of the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies.
The report conveyed this purpose when it embodied the spirit of caution against the
commercialization of human bodies.173 Overall, the report received a warm welcome
when it was realized that its findings had the potential to revolutionize reproductive
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healthcare governance in Canada.174
The framework instituted in the United Kingdom significantly influenced the
drafting of the Canadian legislation. In particular, this inspiration came from the U.K’s
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990.175 The birth of Britain’s first baby with
the aid of assisted human reproductive technology in 1978 initiated a series of debates
related to the ethical issues of assisted human reproduction.176 These deliberations
culminated in Baroness Warnock’s 1985 report A Question of Life that formed the basis
of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act.177 An important goal sought by the
drafters of the AHRA was to create a structure that included a regulatory body as
influential as the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.178 The
establishment of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada emulated this organization. The
adoption of this model was extremely attractive due to the ongoing regulatory vacuum
that was present in an expanding technological field. Although the Canadian legislation
analyzed this foreign legislation to assist in the construction of an effective statute, the
AHRA was the culmination of an extensive consultation process that established a
uniquely Canadian framework.179
The distinctively Canadian nature of the legislation was essential due to the
fundamental political differences that exist between Canada and the United Kingdom.
Academics often note that, in the field of healthcare and biotechnology policy, Canada
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has experienced difficulties formulating legislation because of the countless jurisdictional
issues that arise between the federal and provincial governments.180 Jones and Salter
quoted a respondent in their 2010 article who stated “Canada is different to Britain…
You need to… [create legislation] …in the context of federal/provincial relations, which
are always touchy; but you cannot do it any other way because if it was different in every
province you would get reproductive tourism… It wouldn’t make sense for the
country.”181 Additionally, the authors noted that despite the apparent need for the
framework, it was difficult to garner significant provincial support for the AHRA.182 It
was also suggested that the delicate negotiations between the federal and provincial
governments prevented Canada from legislating in this field at an earlier time.183 Due to
the absence of a federal-parliamentary system, British legislators did not encounter the
critical jurisdictional impediments experienced by Canadian public officials. Regardless
of the well-known inter-governmental tensions between Canadian governmental bodies,
many continued to believe that the introduction of a federal framework was the best route
to take.184
Two years after the publication of Proceed with Care the Minister of Health
Diane Marleau announced a voluntary moratorium on several reproductive technologies
that the Baird Commission had found to be contrary to Canadian ethics and values.185
The resulting committee provided the necessary transition between the final report of the
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Baird Commission and the development of a possible regulatory framework.186
Ultimately, “…several incarnations, five health ministers, two parliamentary sessions,
and many stakeholder consultations…” were needed for the results of the Baird
Commission to become federal legislation.187 The completed legislation known as Bill C6 An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research received Royal
Assent on March 31, 2004.188

5.4 Overview of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
The completed legislation closely followed the major recommendations outlined
in the final report of the Baird Commission. The report suggested a combination of
criminal sanctions and regulations to provide the legislation with the ability to be flexible
and to further respond to evolving technologies.189 The Royal Commission was clear in
communicating its unwavering support of a national framework, stating in the final report
that matters “so important to women and children… cannot differ from province to
province.”190 Using the social and moral implications of assisted reproductive
technologies as a platform, the Baird Commission found ample justification to anchor the
AHRA within federal jurisdiction. It was determined that the federal government was
justified in the creation of a national framework due to the criminal law power and the
residual peace, order, and good government clause that both permit federal legislation in
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areas of ‘national concern’.191
5.4.1 Prohibited Activities

The federal government set out to clearly prohibit specific activities with the
AHRA. Sections 5 to 9 of the Act ban certain actions and if someone breaches these
provisions are guilty of a criminal offence and
a) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding $500,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or both; or 192
b) is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding four years, or both.193

Section 5 pertains to activities involving technical knowledge. The legislation
prohibits the cloning of a human being194 as well as creating an in vitro embryo for any
purposes other than creating a human or improving assisted human reproductive
processes.195 To clarify, an in vitro embryo means an embryo that exists outside of the
body of a human being. The transfer or creation of an embryo from any part of a cell,
embryo or foetus for the purpose of creating a human being is prohibited.196 Following
the fourteenth day of development it is illegal to artificially maintain an embryo, in a
manner that would allow it to continue maturing outside the body of a female.197 Beyond
the intention of creating a human being, alterations are prohibited that would increase the
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probability that an embryo will be a particular sex.198 The only exception to this provision
would be if the alteration would prevent, diagnose, or treat a sex-linked disorder or
disease.199 Furthermore, it is forbidden to alter the genome of a cell to a point where the
alteration would be capable of being transmitted to descendants.200 Any activity involving
the mixture of human and non-human genetic material for the purposes of creating
chimera or hybrids is strictly forbidden.201 Under Section 5 (2) and Section 5 (3) of the
AHRA, offering, advertising, paying or offering to pay for any of the above activities is
designated as committing a criminal offence.202
The provisions located in Section 6 of the Act concern activities involving
surrogate mothers. It is illegal for a person to pay, offer to pay or advertise payment for a
surrogate mother.203 Similarly, it is a criminal offense for someone to pay, advertise or
offer to pay an intermediary to arrange surrogacy services, and for an intermediary to
offer, advertise or organize surrogate services.204 Another provision relating to surrogate
mothers stipulates that, no female under the age of 21 should be counselled, induced, or
undergo any medical procedure to become a surrogate mother.205 The final subsection on
surrogate mothers stipulates that the entirety of Section 6 does not affect the validity of
provincial laws that enable agreements under which a person agrees to become a
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surrogate mother.206
Section 7 of the AHRA contains the provisions directed at preventing the
commercialization of human tissue. No person is allowed to purchase, offer to purchase
or advertise the purchase of in vitro embryos, sperm, ova or any other reproductive
material. In addition, individuals are prohibited from selling, offering to sell or
advertising to sell in vitro embryos.207 Section 8 stipulates that reproductive materials and
in vitro embryos shall not be utilized without the express written consent of the donor.208
These same conditions also apply in the event of the donor’s demise.209 Finally, Section 9
concludes the ‘Prohibited Activities’ section by declaring donors must be at least 18
years of age for the use of any sperm or ova obtained, “except for the purpose of
preserving the sperm or ovum or for the purpose of creating a human being that the
person believes will be raised by the donor.”210
5.4.2 Controlled Activities

The bulk of the AHRA was dedicated to the establishment of a regulatory
framework where assisted reproductive activities would be permitted if practices
occurred in accordance with the regulations and a license issued by the regulatory board
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada. Specifically, Sections 10 to 13 specify
the ‘Controlled Activities’ of the Act. Section 10 designates that no person can alter,
manipulate or treat human reproductive material or an in vitro embryo, unless; the
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activities are in accordance with regulations and the required license.211 Also, except in
compliance with regulations and a license, restrictions are placed on one’s ability to
obtain, transfer, destroy, import or export reproductive material.212 Section 11 explains
that combining human genetic material with any part of the genome of another species is
restricted, except in accordance with the regulations of the Act and a license.213 Section
12 deals specifically with economic considerations such as reimbursement of
expenditures and receipts. Any reimbursements or expenditures that are incurred require
a license and documentary proof of expenses.214 With regards to surrogacy, it is
forbidden to compensate the mother for a loss of work-related income unless a medical
practitioner provides a certificate validating that continuing to work would pose a risk to
the mother and the unborn child.215 The final part of the ‘Controlled Activities’ section
states that the federal government controls the locations where the regulated activities
may be conducted. Thus, activities shall only occur on premises that have been granted a
license.216 Sections 14 to 20 establish rules for the collection of data and the respect of
privacy and access to information. Criminal penalties in section 61 of the AHRA stipulate
that whoever contravenes any of the ‘Controlled Activities’ is guilty of a criminal offence
and
a) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both; or 217
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b) is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding two years, or both.218

To conclude, the focus on social and ethical implications of assisted human
reproduction was central during the term of the Baird Commission. This emphasis
enabled legal scholars to understand why the Commission cited the federal responsibility
related to criminal law to justify legislating in a field of disputed jurisdiction. However,
the ‘Controlled Activities’ provisions in the Act were far more contentious, especially
considering the jurisdictional implications of the regulatory provisions designated within
the section.

5.5 General Observations
Several general observations of the legislation are as follows. The Act embodies
the overall perspective of academics writing in the field of biotechnology policy because
of its focus on social and ethical issues. In contrast, the economic focus of American
biotechnology policy is often seen as unusual because in the scholarly literature, assisted
reproduction is discussed under the umbrella of moral policy rather than economic
policy.219 Regulations in relation to “embryonic stem-cell research; and payment for
sperm, eggs, and surrogacy constitute legal sanctions of right and wrong that validate a
particular set of fundamental values.”220 Although some areas require payment
considerations, issues related to assisted reproduction are not chiefly economic. The
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primary concerns in this field involve parentage, identity, sexuality, reproduction, gender,
and human life itself.221 Additionally, assisted reproduction policy is framed in the
language of individual rights such as “the rights of the infertile; fetal rights; the rights of
single mothers, gays and lesbians; and, most frequently, the rights of children born
through assisted reproduction.”222 For example, the legislation forbids “a variety of
genetics-related technologies including such controversial activities as the creation of
chimerae or hybrids and human germ-line alteration.”223 Furthermore, when compared to
the biotechnology legislation enacted by other modern nations, the AHRA takes a strict
stance against the commercialization of human tissue.224 The AHRA prohibits the direct
exchange of payment for sperm and eggs, and for surrogate motherhood. It is possible for
exchanges to happen but these interactions must occur in the form of expense
reimbursement.225 Finally, those who contravene provisions of the Act are committing a
criminal offense and the authors view this as an attempt “to police a powerful
professional community, the medical practitioners.”226

5.6 The Legislative Landscape and the AHRA
It is important to remind oneself of the legislative landscape during and after the
drafting of the AHRA. Throughout the legislative process leading up to the creation of the
AHRA, some provinces complained that the regulatory aspects of the Act infringed upon
the provincial jurisdiction over the social and medical aspects of fertility technologies.227
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However, legal academic Dave Snow points out that “because few provincial
governments actually expressed any desire to legislate, the federal government moved
forward with the AHRA.”228 Quebec was the only province that maintained certain
aspects of the AHRA were unconstitutional, through a series of letters written to the
federal Minister of Health.229 The reservations of the Quebec government were taken into
consideration, but the threat of a legislative vacuum in a growing technological field was
too drastic to ignore.
Ultimately, numerous stakeholders and groups involved in the drafting of the
legislation had to make compromises to ensure the survival of the legislation.230 During
the drafting process, virtually all organizations and individuals who appeared before
Parliament called for the Bill to be passed.231 Even the Catholic Church, who are
completely opposed to embryo research urged Parliament to pass the legislation.232 These
religious representatives pointed to the events that surrounded the previous abortion laws
in Canada. During the abortion saga, numerous organizations fought against the Canadian
abortion law and in the end the statute was struck down and no law was able to pass the
scrutiny of the Senate to take its place.233 Consequently there is no current criminal law in
Canada that regulates or forbids abortion.
By the end of the 1990’s the stakes were high and it was recognized that there was
an urgent need for policy to take shape in this area. The lack of a regulatory framework in
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Canada prior to the AHRA allowed for clinicians and researchers to practice numerous
controversial activities without guidance or restriction.234 Although it was not possible for
everyone involved with the legislation to be completely satisfied, most could agree that
some sort of framework was preferred rather than none at all.235 In any event, although
the genesis of the AHRA was plagued with problems from the outset and numerous
constitutional questions arose, the legislation that was created using the Commission’s
findings was well received and considered a necessity for Canada by all those involved.
The presence of a legislative vacuum in the field of assisted human reproduction
was one of the main motivations for creating a broad national regulatory framework. The
Quebec government was adamant in their view that the regulatory scheme instituted by
the federal government violated the division of powers as set out in the Constitution Act,
1867. Shortly after the AHRA received Royal Assent, the Quebec government launched a
reference to the Quebec Court of Appeal to determine the constitutional validity of the
Act. It seemed as though the Government of Quebec was emboldened by the fact that the
provincial legislature were in the midst of drafting provincial laws related to assisted
reproduction. In 2009 the government of Quebec passed An Act respecting clinical and
research activities relating to assisted procreation.236 With the enactment of the Assisted
Procreation Act Quebec passed several Civil Code provisions concerning assisted
reproduction, has included in vitro fertilization under provincial health coverage since
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2010, and has adapted its regulations in response to recent judicial decisions.237
Unilateral efforts on behalf of the Canadian federal government to initiate policy
development are not unheard of in Canada. As mentioned, Ottawa in the past has used its
spending power to influence provincial policy, including health policy.238 In recent years
federal approaches to harmonize health policy has been on the decline and this new
environment is not well suited to organize the regulation of assisted reproductive
technology. Dave Snow and Rainer Knopff point to Ottawa’s leadership in achieving
Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) where “Ottawa initiated negotiations but
then came to be seen ‘as an equal party’ rather than a ‘dominant senior partner in intergovernmental arrangements’”.239 While further trade policy harmonization has been
propelled by provincial collaboration, the federal government brought the issue to the
forefront of the provincial economic agendas.240 Still, the presence of inter-provincial
trade barriers exist in Canada and some believe that Ottawa should use its influence to
impose its will on reluctant provinces. However, as will be discussed in the following
section of this project, Ottawa cannot impose its will outside of its criminal law
jurisdiction to influence assisted reproduction technology. Snow and Knopff state that the
federal government “must rely on the softer power of inter-governmental negotiation and
persuasion.”, to influence other aspects of assisted human reproduction policy.241
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6. Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act
6.1 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (Quebec Court of Appeal)
The passing of the AHRA occurred with plenty of constitutional uncertainty,
particularly because the legislation instituted a broad national strategy that was highly
centralized in a field commonly operated by the provinces. The risks that were taken
during the formulation, drafting, and passing of the AHRA were constitutionally assessed
when the government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal
concerning the constitutional validity of the Act.242 The reference question was submitted
in 2008 only four years after the Act received Royal Assent. As mentioned in the previous
section, Quebec was the only government that actively opposed the passing of the AHRA,
so it seemed appropriate that Quebec would be the province to formally challenge the
federal legislation. According to the Attorney General of Quebec, the pith and substance
of the legislation was the regulation of all aspects of medical practices related to assisted
reproduction, including medical practitioners and the institutions where these individuals
work, the doctor-patient relationship, and civil aspects of medically assisted human
reproduction.243 The province of Quebec declared that the legislation was meant to
regulate the exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, as stipulated
in section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.244 The Attorney General of Canada
submitted that the impugned provisions were valid pursuant to the Parliament of
Canada’s power to enact laws in relation to criminal law and the ‘double aspect
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doctrine’.245 He explained that the purpose of the Act is to protect health, safety, and
public morals and that because of this the AHRA had a valid criminal law purpose.246
Double occupancy of a field such as health is a permanent feature of the Canadian
constitutional structure. It leads to a standard of ‘double aspect’ analysis under which two
separate aspects, one federal and the other provincial, exist side by side unless there is a
conflict, in which case the federal aspect prevails.247 The absolute prohibitions were
conceded to be valid criminal law and were not challenged. The Quebec Court of Appeal
issued its reference opinion, siding entirely with the government of Quebec and ruling
nearly every regulatory component of the AHRA unconstitutional.248 When the Attorney
General of Canada appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada he did not include the
‘double aspect’ doctrine in his justification. Therefore, for the purposes of this project it
is not necessary to perform an examination of the ‘double aspect’ doctrine. On the other
hand, in order to fully understand the federal government’s reasoning for using the
federal criminal law power to justify its argument in the Supreme Court reference case
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2010), it is essential to perform a brief
analysis of the criminal law power as an accepted constitutional principle. Furthermore,
in the Supreme Court reference the position of the Attorney General of Quebec remained
the same, thus an explanation of the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights
will also be provided.
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6.2 Federal Criminal Law Power
In Canada, Section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 assigns the responsibility
of criminal law to federal Parliament.249 As demonstrated by the case law, s.91 (27) has
experienced dramatic shifts of judicial interpretation. In the 1922 reference decision
entitled Reference re The Board of Commerce Act,250 Viscount Haldane interpreted the
criminal law power as applicable only “where the subject matter is one which by its very
nature belongs to the domain of criminal jurisprudence.”251 The definition of the criminal
law power provided in the Reference re The Board of Commerce Act opinion appeared to
be quite restrictive. Although Viscount Haldane did not clarify what was meant by ‘the
domain of criminal jurisprudence’, Peter Hogg argues that “the phrase could be read as
freezing the criminal law into a mould established at some earlier time, presumably
1867.”252
Subsequently in 1931, four years after the death of Viscount Haldane, Lord Atkin
rendered a decision in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. AG Canada (P.A.T.A)253
that drastically altered the interpretation of the criminal law power. Lord Atkin rejected
the narrow definition of criminal law, which stipulated that the power would be restricted
to matters that have traditionally fallen within the domain of criminal jurisprudence.254
Instead, Lord Atkin declared a very wide definition of the criminal law power, one “that
included all acts that at any particular period of time are prohibited with penal
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sanctions.”255 However, this new definition appeared too wide, as it would enable the
federal Parliament to expand its jurisdiction indiscriminately, simply by presenting
legislation in the form of a prohibition accompanied by a penalty.256 Lord Atkin clarified
that this new understanding of the criminal law power did not excuse Parliament if it used
this power to intentionally encroach on provincial jurisdiction.257 According to Hogg,
“the P.A.T.A. definition is still too wide, because it would uphold any federal law which
employs a prohibition and penalty as its primary mode of operation.”258
One of the most famous cases related to the criminal law power is commonly
referred to as the Margarine Reference (1951).259 Modern discussions of Parliament’s
criminal law power begin with this reference because the opinion rendered establishes a
third criterion in the definition of criminal law. In the 1880’s the federal government
passed legislation that prohibited the manufacture, importation or sale of margarine.260 At
this time margarine posed a legitimate threat to the health and safety of Canadians. This
was because the poor quality of the product led to the presence of abnormally high e-coli
levels within margarine. During World War II, however, there was a shortage of dairy
products because of resources being dedicated to the war effort and many farmers were
involved as soldiers in the conflict overseas. Moreover, after the war ended it was
recognized that margarine had began to be manufactured differently and that as a result, it
was a realistic cheaper oil-based substitute to dairy products such as butter. As time
passed, it was realized that the purpose of the prohibition on margarine was to protect the
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dairy industry.261 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that, although the law
pertaining to margarine abided by the criminal form of a prohibition backed by a penalty,
the economic aspect of the legislation insulating the dairy industry from competition
made the substance of the law related to property and civil rights of the provinces.262 The
judicial reasoning that followed from the Margarine Reference opinion has had a lasting
impact on the Canadian conception of the federal criminal law power. The JCPC adopted
the reasoning of Canadian Supreme Court Justice Rand, when they accepted that a
criminal prohibition was not criminal unless it served “a public purpose which can
support it as being in relation to the criminal law.”263 Specifically, public peace, order,
security, health and morality were considered ordinary but not exclusive ends served by
criminal law.264 After establishing this new step in the criminal law analysis, Rand J.
determined that the protection of the dairy industry did not constitute a qualifying
purpose to invoke the criminal law power.265
The judicial reasoning of Viscount Haldane, Lord Atkin and finally, Canadian
Supreme Court Justice Rand outlined the fundamental tenets of the criminal law power.
Yet the specific facet of the criminal law power that directly pertains to the Reference re
Assisted Human Reproduction Act is whether Rand’s interpretation of section 91 (27)
“will sustain the establishment of a regulatory scheme in which an administrative agency
or official exercises discretionary authority.”266 Typically, there is not any intervention by
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an administrative agency or official prior to the application of a law.267 It is common for a
law to be administered by law enforcement officials and for the courts to act in a
mechanical capacity after the prohibited conduct has occurred.268 The cases that follow
are meant to demonstrate the progression of the relationship between criminal law and
regulatory authority.
6.2.1 Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil

In 1967, the provincial government of Nova Scotia enacted the Theatres and
Amusements Act to establish a licensing and regulation system for the showing of motion
pictures.269 The legislation required all films to be submitted to the provincial censor
board prior to being released to the public.270 The board had the power to allow or forbid
the showing of a film, or to permit its exhibition with alterations.271 Sanction for breach
of board regulations resulted in a monetary penalty and removal of the theatre owner’s
license.272 A private citizen pursued legal action to have the censor board regulations
declared unconstitutional, specifically by arguing that the provincial legislature was
infringing on federal jurisdiction by wrongfully exercising the criminal law power.
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada in Nova Scotia Board of Censors v.
McNeil,273 by a narrow margin of five to four, held that the censorship of films was not
criminal.274 Ritchie J., writing for the majority, determined that the provincial censorship
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law did not take criminal form because it did not issue a prohibition coupled with a
penalty.275 As noted by Hogg, the suppression of ideas that are contrary to current moral
attitudes is a criminal objective but in this instance the prior case law necessitated a
particular form as well as a criminal objective.276
The precedent set by Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil outlined that one of
the main constraints on the criminal law power was in relation to form. The usual form of
criminal legislation is characterized by a prohibition and penalty enforced by the
courts.277
The presence of regulatory features in federal legislation “such as powers of
licensing and prior inspection, involvement of an administrative agency exercising
discretionary authority in the administration of the law, detailed regulation and civil
remedies” may prevent the judiciary from viewing the law as an authentic exercise of the
criminal law power.278 It is important to note that, in cases where a clear criminal law
purpose has been found, courts have allowed for a slight departure from the general
expectation that valid criminal law must be a prohibition backed by a penalty.279
6.2.2 R. v. Hydro-Quebec

The federal government established a framework under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act that regulated the use and disposal of toxic substances.280
Under the legislation the Canadian Minister of Health and the Minister of Environment
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were granted the authority to examine the effects of substances and recommend the
substance be labeled toxic.281 Once classified as toxic, the substance comes under the
regulatory authority of the Governor in Council, which may institute regulations
pertaining to the toxic substance.282 These directives may include how the substance is
imported, manufactured, processed, transported, stored, sold, used, discarded and
released into the environment.283 However, in select circumstances where a substance has
not yet been classified as toxic, either Minister may decide immediate action must be
taken and issue an ‘interim order’ in the absence of full toxic categorization.284 The
interim order is temporary but breach of the order or of an established regulation is an
offence punishable by fine or imprisonment.285
In the 1997 Canadian Supreme Court case entitled R. v. Hydro-Quebec (HydroQuebec),286 Hydro-Quebec was accused of violating an interim order issued under the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act.287 The order was violated when Hydro-Quebec
dumped chlorobiphenyls into a river in 1990.288 The corporation argued that the entire
Act, and by extension the interim order, was ultra vires the federal jurisdiction of criminal
law. However, La Forest J. writing for the majority, upheld the Act as a valid exercise of
the federal government’s criminal law power. The reasoning behind this judgment was
that, because the administrative procedure resulted in a prohibition supported by a penal
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sanction, the framework was adequately prohibitory in nature.289 Furthermore, he
recognized that the exemption for provinces with comparative legislation effectively
meant that the preservation of the environment was concurrent.290 At any rate, this
decision solidified the modern judicial stance that an extensive degree of regulation could
be justified under the criminal law power.291
6.2.3 Reference re Firearms Act (2000)

A reference question was posed to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2000,
pertaining to federal gun control legislation that was a part of the Canadian Criminal
Code. The unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in Reference re Firearms Act
(2000)292 maintained that because the purpose of gun control was public safety the Act
was serving a criminal law purpose.293 It was argued that the legislation was regulatory
rather than criminal because of the statutory complexity of the scheme and the
discretionary powers granted to licensing authorities.294 Opponents of the legislation
declared that only an outright prohibition of guns would constitute a proper criminal
law.295 In the reference the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the federal
legislation, which amended the Criminal Code of Canada and created an extensive
licensing and registration statute for firearms owners.296 To support the opinion of the
bench, the Supreme Court cited its decision in R. v. Hydro-Quebec to clarify that “the
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criminal-law power authorizes complex legislation, including discretionary
administrative authority.”297 Furthermore, the Court highlighted that in RJR-MacDonald
v. Canada (1995)298 it was determined that a criminal purpose may be pursued by indirect
means.299 The Court proclaimed that the safety risks of guns did not require an outright
ban on firearms and similarly, the health hazards of tobacco did not necessitate a
complete ban of cigarettes.300 In essence, procedures that indirectly advance a legislative
purpose, such as advertising bans on tobacco products or the licensing and registration of
firearms, were authorized by the federal criminal law power.301
Numerous variations in judicial mindset concerning the criminal law and
regulatory authority are demonstrated in the case law of the federal criminal law power.
Regardless of these fluctuations, a clear precedent was established leading up to the
opinion rendered in the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act. This precedent
demonstrated that it was possible for the criminal law power to justify the institution of
an intricate legal framework that creates a regulatory board that is able to enforce
sanctions authorized by specific legislation.

6.3 Provincial Jurisdiction Over Property and Civil Rights
When the reference question concerning the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
was posed to the Quebec Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court of
Canada, the Attorney General of Quebec argued that the legislation infringed upon the
provincial government’s exclusive legislative authority over property, civil rights and
297
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matters of local or private nature.302 Therefore, a brief discussion of these provincial
responsibilities is essential when attempting to understand the position of the provinces in
the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act.
Section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants the provincial legislatures the
ability to make laws in relation to “property and civil rights in the province.”303 This
provincial power has played a significant role in numerous constitutional disputes. As
Hogg notes, “This is by far the most important of the provincial heads of power.”304
Arguably the most significant sources of federal power are those pertaining to peace,
order, and good government, trade and commerce, and criminal law.305 These three major
federal jurisdictions have come into direct conflict with the property and civil rights
provision. Many of the most vital cases related to constitutional law have put different
federal heads of power up against the provincial responsibility over property and civil
rights.306
The phrase ‘property and civil rights’ is one that has long been part of Canadian
political history, as its presence extends as far back as the Quebec Act, 1774.307
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between the pre-Confederation meaning of the
phrase and how the phrase was utilized within the context of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The first notable appearance of the phrase occurred in section 8 of the Quebec Act, 1774
and its inclusion resulted in the reinstatement of the French Civil Law tradition as the
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private law system within the borders of Quebec.308 The section was created to guarantee
that the entire body of law governing relationships between individuals within Quebec
would not be displaced.309 Furthermore, the phrase was also included in the first Act of
the Legislature of the province of Upper Canada, when in 1792 the province declared
English law as the private law of the colony.310
The phrase was solidified when the Fathers of Confederation designated
‘property and civil rights in the province’ as a provincial power in section 92 (13) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. The drafters of the Canadian constitution included property and
civil rights to describe the complete body of private law that manages the relationships
between citizens, in contrast to the law that governs interactions between citizens and the
state.311 Originally, the phrase was meant to have the same meaning as it had obtained in
1774 and 1792. However, with the creation of a new federal system the property and civil
rights provision was now operating alongside a new central branch of government with
extensive powers and responsibilities.312 This new reality altered the traditional definition
of property and civil rights. For the federal Parliament to operate effectively within the
Canadian federation it was necessary for certain federal responsibilities to include a
number of provisions that were part of the original conception of property and civil
rights.313 Some of the matters that were redistributed included trade and commerce,
marriage and divorce, patents of invention and discovery, interest, and banking.314
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Moreover, the peace, order and good government phrase included in the Constitution Act,
1867 allows the federal government, in situations with national implications, to overstep
the boundaries established by the property and civil rights provision.
The use of peace, order and good government to justify the occasional
infringement of provincial jurisdiction is reflected in the 1966 Supreme Court of Canada
decision Munro v. National Capital Commission.315 The National Capital Act established
a National Capital Commission that was mandated to “prepare plans for and assist in the
development, conservation and improvement of the National Capital Region… in
accordance with its national significance.”316 Litigation occurred when property owned
by Munro was expropriated under the Act to ensure the development of the National
Capital Region around Ottawa.317 Munro argued that the federal legislation was a form
of planning and zoning legislation already governed by the provincial Planning Acts. The
decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that the development of the
National Capital Region was justified under the peace, order and good government
principle because the development was a single matter of national concern.318
Even with the reallocation of specific property and civil rights powers to the list
of exclusive federal powers “property and civil rights in the province still covers most of
the legal relationships between persons in Canada.”319 The body of law relating to
property, succession, the family, contracts and torts is largely within provincial
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jurisdiction under s. 92 (13).320 It is important for the purposes of this project to highlight
that the historical foundation of property and civil rights in Canada differs from the
foundation of similar rights in other nations. The purpose of doing so is to clarify how the
terms are used and defined in Canadian law. In the United States, the term ‘civil rights’
is interchangeable with the civil liberties that are guaranteed in the American Bill of
Rights.321 When referring to the use of civil rights in the Constitution Act, 1867, civil
rights and civil liberties are distinct from one another. The civil rights referred to in the
Constitution Act, 1867 are made up of mainly proprietary, contractual or tortious
rights.322 These rights come into existence when a legal rule stipulates that in certain
circumstances one person is entitled to something from another.323 In contrast, civil
liberties exist when there is an absence of formal legal rules. In the Canadian context
saying one has the right to criticize the government is something completely different
from declaring one’s right to have a loan repaid.324 This differentiation exists because
there is no law that forbids the criticism of government but there is however, the law of
contract that stipulates certain commitments must be performed, “…by imposing
sanctions for non-performance.”325 In sum, the term ‘civil rights’ in s. 92 (13) of the
Canadian Constitution is utilized in a different sense, especially when compared to the
United States.
The dominance of s. 92 (13) in constitutional disputes has resulted in the limited
use of s.92 (16) or the provincial power over “… all matters of merely local or private
320
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nature in the province…”326 Although the section has not been completely ignored, when
mentioned it is often suggested as an alternative to s. 92 (13) as opposed to an
independent source of power. Different cases have suggested that arguments would have
been best served by using s. 92 (16) as the sole justification. In most cases the provincial
power related to matters of local or private nature is often presented in tandem with s. 92
(13).
The powerful provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights and local
matters are the sections of the Constitution Act, 1867 that the government of Quebec
cited when the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act went to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The stage was now set for the Supreme Court to analyze the piece of
legislation and determine the constitutional validity of its provisions.

6.4 Overview of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act (2010) Opinion
The opinion written by the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the constitutional
justification of the AHRA prompted a reaction from the Government of Canada. This
response occurred when the Attorney General of Canada decided to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada. Using almost identical constitutional justifications presented
at the Quebec Court of Appeal the AHRA was to be analyzed by Canada’s highest court.
However at the Supreme Court level, the Attorney Generals of New Brunswick,
Saskatchewan and Alberta, who were each granted intervener status, supported the
reasoning of the government of Quebec. The Supreme Court of Canada issued a 4-4-1
split opinion regarding the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (Ref re
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AHRA) in December 2010. The Court was bitterly divided in its opinion particularly
regarding the dominant purpose of the federal legislation.327 Four justices would have
held the Act as valid in its entirety because they concluded the dominant purpose was to
safeguard morality, public health and the personal security of those associated with
assisted reproductive technology.328 The other four Supreme Court Justices decided that
the overriding purpose of the AHRA was to regulate assisted human reproduction as a
health service.329 Essentially, the Justices were contemplating two questions that were
raised by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin:
“is the Assisted Human Reproduction Act properly characterized as legislation to
curtail practices that may contravene morality, create public health evils or put the
security of individuals at risk, as the Attorney General of Canada contends? Or
should it be characterized as legislation to promote positive medical practices
associated with assisted reproduction, as the Attorney General of Quebec
contends?”330
It is apparent that the Court was attempting to determine if the dominant purpose of the
legislation was to prohibit an ‘evil’ or regulate a ‘good’.331
6.4.1 The Opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin

Chief Justice McLachlin, with Justices Binnie, Fish and Charron concurring,
provided the first opinion in the Ref re AHRA. McLachlin C.J. began her opinion by
pointing out that each generation encounters unique moral issues and historically, those
327
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generations have relied upon criminal law to address them.332 With the development of
assisted reproduction technologies important moral, religious and juridical questions
arose.333 The enormous advances in a budding technological field encouraged the
Canadian federal government to appoint the Baird Commission in an effort to examine
the numerous implications of assisted reproduction technologies.334 The efforts and
findings of the Baird Commission resulted in the creation of the AHRA. The Chief Justice
clarified that sections 5 to 7 of the AHRA were conceded as criminal law but the Attorney
General of Quebec was challenging the remaining provisions.335 In the view of
McLachlin C.J., the additonal sections 8 to 13 would have been declared as valid criminal
law.336 Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that some of the prohibitions impacted the
regulation of medical research and practice, as both areas are commonly controlled by the
provinces. However, the effect that the legislation had on these provincial matters was
purely incidental to the Act’s criminal law purpose.337 In addition, McLachlin C.J.
recognized that sections 14 to 68 of the AHRA – the administrative, organizational and
enforcement provisions – were not, in pith and substance criminal law, but were valid as
they were essential to the successful operation of the overall prohibition regime.338
After providing a breakdown of both the prohibited activities and controlled
activities sections contained within the AHRA, McLachlin C.J. held that the remaining
sections of the legislation “are directed [at] administering and enforcing the primary
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criminal law prohibitions.”339 The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General
of Quebec viewed the legislation from two fundamentally different perspectives. The
Attorney General of Canada stated that the purpose and effect of the legislative scheme
was to prohibit practices that would undercut moral values, produce public evils, and
threaten the security of donors, donees, and persons conceived by assisted
reproduction.340 The Attorney General of Quebec submitted that the central purpose of
the legislation was to regulate the field of reproductive medicine and research.341 Thus
the federal government maintained that the legislation was a valid exercise of the federal
criminal law power, while Quebec asserted that the legislation established an illegal
scheme that regulated matters associated with health concerns that fall under the
provincial powers.342
McLachlin C.J. explained that the purpose of the Act was to prohibit reprehensible
activities by imposing sanctions. She categorized the Act as a series of prohibitions
followed by a set of secondary provisions governing their administration.343 Chief Justice
McLachlin chose to highlight that her colleagues who provided the second opinion in the
Ref re AHRA believed the legislation had two purposes. This meant that the other judges
thought the legislation was aimed at prohibiting reprehensible conduct and also
promoting beneficial practices.344 The dissenting justices claimed that criminal law is
only concerned with prohibiting undesirable conduct, and does not extend to promoting
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the beneficial aspects of assisted reproductive technologies.345 However, McLachlin C.J.
clarified that the Act did not have two purposes, but rather targeted unacceptable conduct
while incidentally permitting beneficial practices through regulations.346 The regulation
of positive actions in McLachlin C.J.’s opinion did not make the AHRA
unconstitutional.347 The central issue was whether or not the AHRA had a dominant
criminal purpose. In the opinion of McLachlin C.J. the AHRA did in fact have a dominant
criminal law purpose. Furthermore, one of the goals of criminal legislation is to prohibit
certain actions in order to achieve desired beneficial effects.348 Therefore, the presence of
a dominant criminal law purpose enabled the federal government to enact a law that had a
substantial impact on matters outside of its jurisdiction.349
In her effort to establish that the AHRA fell within section 91 (27) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 Chief Justice McLachlin proposed that the legislation fulfilled the
recognized criteria to qualify as valid criminal law. The established principle related to
the federal criminal law power was cited in the recent reference opinion entitled Ref re
Firearms Act (Canada) in 2000. In that reference the Court reiterated the opinion of Rand
J. who in the Margarine Reference stated that a proper exercise of the federal criminal
law power must include a prohibition, backed by a penalty, with a criminal law
purpose.350 McLachlin C.J. stated that the AHRA imposed prohibitions backed by
appropriate penalties, but some of the provisions did permit certain exceptions. A large
portion of the legislation was dedicated to the establishment of a regulatory framework.
345
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However, McLachlin C.J. was clear in her opinion when she stated that Parliament is
permitted to create a regulatory scheme under the criminal law power, provided that the
regulatory structure advances the criminal law objective.351 Additionally, she cited the
Hydro-Quebec case to communicate that “The complexity of modern problems often
requires a nuanced scheme consisting of a mixture of absolute prohibitions, selective
prohibitions based on regulations, and supporting administrative provisions.”352 The
established precedent permitted the existence of legislation that creates a regulatory
framework, and in turn allows flexibility that is vital in changing fields such as the
environmental policy and assisted reproductive technologies.353
McLachlin C.J. was mindful of the Attorney General of Quebec’s objections to
sections 8 to 13 of the AHRA. She was aware that the Attorney General of Quebec was
scrutinizing the provisions in a way where the ‘absolute prohibitions’ were separate from
the ‘controlled activities’ section of the legislation.354 When viewed in this way, the
Attorney General of Quebec contended that the ‘controlled activities’ category as set out
in sections 10 to 13 of the Act created a system that was meant to regulate medicine and
research in the area of assisted reproduction.355 The Attorney General of Quebec went on
to view sections 8 and 9 through a similar lens.356 In essence, the Attorney General of
Quebec’s contention was that sections 8 to 13 of the AHRA were in pith and substance an
attempt to regulate the medical profession and medical research.357 The validity of the
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Attorney General of Quebec’s argument was reliant upon sections 8 to 13 being
examined in isolation from the rest of the Act. However, McLachlin C.J. disagreed and
insisted the Act must be scrutinized within the entire legislative context “which takes into
account the relationship between the absolute and selective prohibitions, as well as the
other provisions of the Act.”358 When viewed within the context of the complete
legislative scheme sections 8 to 13 were directed in pith and substance to be valid
criminal law objectives.359
McLachlin C.J. was convinced that assisted reproduction raised significant moral
concerns. She viewed the Act in its entirety as a legitimate attempt to avoid serious
damage to the fabric of Canadian society by prohibiting and regulating practices that had
the potential to devalue human life and degrade participants.360 She continued to reason
that the Act served a valid criminal law purpose as it was grounded in issues that
Canadians consider to be of fundamental importance.361 Based upon this logic and the
topics discussed above, McLachlin C.J. concluded that the legislative scheme instituted
by the AHRA was not meant to promote positive health measures, but rather to address
legitimate criminal law matters.362 Therefore, the official opinion of McLachlin C.J. and
the three others concurring was that the entire Act is valid criminal legislation.363

358

Ref re AHRA, supra note 247 at para 87.
Ibid at para 88.
360
Ibid at para 61.
361
Ibid at para 62.
362
Ibid at para 64.
363
Ibid at para 156.
359

78
6.4.2 The Joint Reference Opinion of Justices Deschamps and LeBel

The crucial difference between Chief Justice McLachlin’s outlook and the second
opinion of the Ref re AHRA rendered by Justices Deschamps and LeBel, with Justices
Abella and Rothstein concurring, is demonstrated in the way the judges considered the
impugned provisions. The opening paragraph of the Deschamps and LeBel JJ. opinion
demonstrated the key difference in how the legislation was analyzed. The justices
proposed that it was incorrect to look at the entire AHRA as one cohesive piece of
legislation.364 Furthermore, Justices Deschamps and LeBel declared that the appeal
related “to the connection between certain provisions of the AHR Act [or the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act] and the federal criminal law power.”365
The two justices began by reproducing specific sections of the AHRA to determine
the overall objective Parliament was pursuing when the legislation was enacted.
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. then emphasized how the provisions of the Act were divided
into two categories; the ‘prohibited activities’ and ‘controlled activities’. In their view the
provisions under these two separate headings represented two distinct branches of
activities related to assisted human reproduction.366 Deschamps and LeBel JJ. relied upon
the final report of the Baird Commission to highlight the fundamental difference that
existed between the prohibited and controlled activities sections of the AHRA. Citing
specific statements published in Proceed with Care, the justices conceived “that the
Commission was of the opinion that assisted reproductive activities and related research
should be permitted. This means that it considered them morally and socially
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acceptable.”367 The opinion was developed further when Deschamps and LeBel JJ.
explained the prohibited activities section of the Act listed dangerous activities and the
controlled activities contained provisions that benefitted society.
Justices Deschamps and LeBel acknowledged that the interpretation they
provided was vastly different from the justification provided in the first opinion written
by Chief Justice McLachlin. The judges thought McLachlin C.J. was incorrect when she
chose to disregard the legislative history of the AHRA in her judicial reasoning.368
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. maintained the standpoint that the legislative history and the
Baird Commission’s distinctions between prohibited and controlled activities needed to
be considered when interpreting the goals of the legislation.369 Deschamps and LeBel JJ.
argued that the difference of opinion occurred because McLachlin C.J. refused to
consider factors outside the text of the AHRA itself. The justices supported their outlook
further by citing the opinion of the Quebec Court of Appeal. In essence, the Quebec
Court of Appeal determined that “the fundamental and dominant purpose of the
impugned part of the Act is the safeguarding of health and not the elimination of an
‘evil’.”370
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. rejected the Attorney General of Canada’s argument
that the analysis of the AHRA should be conducted while considering the entire piece of
legislation. Instead, they believed that the impugned provisions were to be studied
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separately from the rest of the Act.371 Justices Deschamps and LeBel performed an
analysis of the impugned provisions considering the stipulations in isolation from the
remainder of the AHRA.372 In addition, the justices thought it was obvious that the Baird
Commission wanted to prohibit certain activities and to create a national framework to
institute uniform guidelines. These standards would apply across Canada and govern
assisted human reproduction and related research activities.373 The justices reasoned that
separation of the AHRA into two distinct categories of activities signified that the Baird
Commission recommended two unique approaches with different purposes.374
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. determined that the way the AHRA was drafted demonstrated a
clear dichotomy between reprehensible activities and other desirable practices.375 They
took this as an indication that Parliament accepted the recommendations of the Baird
Commission when it drafted legislation containing two separate sections with different
goals.376
According to Deschamps and LeBel JJ., expert reports and official parliamentary
transcripts submitted by the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of
Quebec suggested the positive perspective of assisted human reproduction in society. The
justices interpreted these sources as evidence that society did not view assisted
reproductive technologies as a social ‘evil’, but as a potential solution to reproductive
problems experienced by a segment of society.377 For these reasons it was postulated that
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assisted reproductive technologies were regarded as a form of scientific progress that was
of great value to those with infertility issues.378 Therefore, the justices ascertained that the
impugned provisions concerning the controlled activities of the AHRA did not have the
same purpose as sections containing the prohibited activities.379 As a result, Deschamps
and LeBel JJ. identified that the pith and substance of the impugned provisions was
characterized as the regulation of assisted human reproduction as a health service.380
During Deschamps and LeBel JJ.’s analysis of the federal criminal law power,
they stated that Rand J.’s reference to an ‘evil’ in the Margarine Reference required the
evil or threat to be real and legitimate.381 Without this essential interpretation the criminal
law power would be given unlimited scope and the federal government would have the
authority under the Constitution to enact laws in any jurisdiction.382 The justices could
not find any evidence on record to suggest that the controlled activities were to “be
regarded as conduct that is reprehensible or represents a serious risk to morality, safety or
public health.”383 Therefore, it was determined that the purpose of the AHRA was not to
protect individuals from actions that were inherently harmful, but rather to encourage
medical practice and research that brings benefits to Canadians.384 Deschamps and LeBel
JJ. warned that if the AHRA was determined to be constitutional it would set a dangerous
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precedent that would allow the federal government to legislate in every situation
concerning a new medical technology.385
In the opinion of Deschamps and LeBel JJ. the impugned provisions properly fell
within the domain of provincial jurisdiction. In particular, the provisions related to the
provinces’ exclusive jurisdiction over hospitals, education, property and civil rights, and
matters of a merely local nature.386 However, the justices appealed to the principle of
subsidiarity to continue to give strength to their view. According to the principle
“legislative action is to be taken by the government that is closest to the citizen and is
thus considered to be in the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns.”387 They
continued on to point out that Peter W. Hogg stated the broad interpretation the JCPC
awarded to the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights could be explained by
the Council’s acceptance of the principle.388 However, it was unnecessary to rely on the
principle because the justices claimed there was no doubt that the provisions invaded
exclusive provincial jurisdiction.389
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. began their conclusion by reiterating that “two very
different aspects of genetic manipulation have been combined in a single piece of
legislation.”390 The justices declared that the social and ethical concerns of each category
appeared to be distinct and even divergent.391 Justices Deschamps and LeBel concluded
“Parliament has therefore made a specious attempt to exercise its criminal law power by
385
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merely juxtaposing provisions falling within provincial jurisdiction with others that in
fact relate to criminal law…”392 Moreover, the regulatory scheme was deemed
constitutionally invalid because the legislative historical account suggested assisted
reproduction activities did not connect to criminal law. In other words, Deschamps and
LeBel JJ. viewed the legislative history of the AHRA and the significant impact the
impugned provisions had on provincial matters as an attempt by Parliament to enact
legislation in a matter outside of its jurisdiction.393 All of the reasons listed above led
Justices Deschamps and LeBel with Justices Abella and Rothstein concurring, to the
conclusion that the all of the impugned provisions were unconstitutional and should be
struck down.
6.4.3 The Deciding Reference Opinion of Justice Cromwell

Justice Cromwell was the final Justice who wrote the third and deciding opinion
of the Ref re AHRA. Cromwell J. was the lone justice who disagreed with the opinions
rendered by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Deschamps and LeBel.394 Justice
Cromwell disagreed with McLachlin C.J.’s opinion that the purpose of the legislation was
to prohibit negative practices associated with assisted reproduction.395 In addition,
however, Cromwell J. also contended that Deschamps and LeBel JJ’s opinion was too
narrow. He claimed that the purpose and effect of the legislation was not limited to the
regulation of assisted human reproduction as a health service.396 He asserted that the
question in this reference case was “whether the federal criminal law power permits
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Parliament to regulate virtually all aspects of research and clinical practice in relation to
assisted human reproduction.”397 Cromwell J.’s opinion differed from those of his
colleagues because he believed the essence of the impugned provisions went beyond
prohibiting negative practices and enabled the federal government to minutely regulate
research and clinical practice.398 Thus, Cromwell J. issued his opinion stating that the
impugned provisions relate to three areas of provincial jurisdiction.399 The three subjects
included “the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals; property and
civil rights in the province; and matters of a merely local or private nature in the
province.”400 Cromwell J. reasoned that the impugned provisions did not serve a criminal
law purpose as recognized by the jurisprudence. Furthermore, Cromwell J. agreed with
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. that the impugned provisions when viewed in isolation did not
fall under criminal law.401
Although Justice Cromwell agreed in part with both of the preceding
justifications, he needed to supply his judicial reasoning in order to complete the
Supreme Court’s final opinion of the Ref re AHRA . Justice Cromwell explained which
provisions within the AHRA were to remain and which sections were to be declared as
unconstitutional. Unlike Deschamps and LeBel JJ., Justice Cromwell determined that
some of the impugned provisions were anchored in the federal criminal law power. He
concluded that sections “8, 9 and 12 in purpose and effect prohibit negative practices
associated with assisted reproduction and that they fall within the traditional ambit of the
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federal criminal law power.”402 The constitutional affirmation of section 12 led to
specific mechanisms that would ensure its implementation being upheld. In sum,
Cromwell J., supported Chief Justice McLachlin in her opinion to uphold all of the
prohibited activities set out in the AHRA.403 However, Cromwell J. partly supported the
opinion supplied by Deschamps and LeBel JJ. This occurred when all of the remaining
impugned provisions outside of those listed in the absolute prohibitions section of the Act
were struck down as ultra vires federal jurisdiction.404
As a result of Justice Cromwell’s deciding opinion in the Ref re AHRA, the
absolute prohibitions in the AHRA were upheld as criminal law, but the controlled
activities, licensing and regulatory framework that supported the qualified prohibitions
were mostly struck down.405

6.5 Critical Commentary on the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction
Act
Historically, constitutional disputes related to section 91 (27) centred on how to
define criminal acts. More recently, the focus on the criminal law power has shifted from
an inquiry to what constitutes a valid criminal law purpose to the judicial interpretation of
the federal criminal law power’s regulatory function.406 The expanding nature concerning
the regulatory function of section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was assessed in
the Ref re AHRA. Previous decisions related to the regulatory function of the federal
criminal law power in Hydro-Quebec and Reference re Firearms Act (Canada) sustained
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the establishment of intricate regulatory and licensing regimes under section 91 (27).
However, the majority opinion in Ref re AHRA “signals that at least a majority of the
current justices has grown uneasy about an ever-expanding regulatory capacity for the
criminal law.”407
The AHRA opens with a broad declaration of principles found in section 2,
principles that are not typically advanced by the criminal law.408 These principles
communicated what Parliament was attempting to do with the legislation. In particular,
the Government of Canada wanted to ensure the health and well-being of children born
through the application of assisted human reproductive technologies, while protecting
human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome.409 Recall that
sections 5 to 7, which contain the absolute prohibitions of the AHRA, such as creation of
a human clone, creation of an in vitro embryo for purposes other than assisted human
reproduction, creation of a chimera, or payment for surrogacy or for donation of human
reproductive material, were not challenged.410 Recall, too, that sections 8, 9 and 12,
which prohibit the use of human reproductive material or embryos without consent,
obtaining sperm or ova from a minor except for their own reproductive purposes, and
reimbursement for donors or surrogates except by the mandatory regulations, were
challenged but upheld as valid criminal law.411 Finally, sections 10, 11 and 13 banning
controlled activities such as manipulating, using or storing an in vitro embryo or material
created through the combination of animal and human matter except in accordance with a
407
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license and the regulations, and on a licensed premises, were struck down as ultra vires
federal jurisdiction.412
All of the justices agreed that an essential component of a valid use of the
criminal law power requires the statute in question to have the purpose of preventing a
legitimate ‘evil’ or harm. As Chief Justice McLachlin recognized, “The federal criminal
law power may only be used to prohibit conduct, and may not be employed to promote
beneficial medical practices.”413 Professor Barbara von Tigerstrom agreed that the
restriction to the prohibition of conduct is necessary in order to prevent an overly
expansive interpretation of the criminal law power, but also noted that it is in practice
challenging to apply this restriction.414 It is difficult to identify the dominant purpose of
an activity because many actions can have positive and negative effects. To help guide
the justices to the appropriate judicial opinion the courts rely on judicial precedent. The
precedent established before the Ref re AHRA in cases like Hydro-Quebec led to the
belief that there was “considerable scope for future federal legislation aimed at
controlling activities which put human health at risk, including those which have
historically been perceived as entirely legitimate in nature.”415 This belief led McLachlin
C.J. to reason that a regulatory scheme, such as the one established by the AHRA, can be
characterized as valid criminal law.416 The constitutional pedigree heading into the
reference suggested that the AHRA had a valid regulatory purpose steeped in
constitutional precedent. Peter W. Hogg supported the view of the Chief Justice when he
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stated “In light of the decided cases, especially Hydro-Quebec, [Chief Justice
McLachlin’s] opinion seemed to be the correct answer to the constitutional
question…”417
The position of Deschamps and Lebel JJ. appeared to be that since assisted
reproduction technologies were beneficial and legitimate, then they were not inherently
harmful or evil and as a result, could not be classified as valid criminal law. von
Tigerstrom does not believe that it is easy to classify particular actions as “either
beneficial and legitimate or harmful and reprehensible…”418 I agree with Professor von
Tigerstrom’s view because it is possible that countless risks can be associated with
numerous activities even if they are designated as beneficial. If the opinion of Justices
Deschamps and LeBel suggested that the federal criminal law power cannot be used to
address such risks, then it would call into question a series of decisions that have
previously validated this type of federal action.419
There was a prevailing cautiousness shown by the majority of the Supreme Court
Justices in the Ref re AHRA. It was apparent that the justices were concerned about the
intensifying influence of the regulatory function of Parliament’s criminal law power.420 In
particular, if the regulatory provisions of the AHRA were upheld, it might have allowed
the federal government to regulate all health care practices under the auspices of the
criminal law power. I agree with the perspective of John D. Whyte that while the
Canadian Constitution recognizes certain situations where federal jurisdiction may
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infringe upon provincial matters, this should not drastically alter the basic constitutional
balance between the federal and provincial legislative capacities.421 Nonetheless, legal
scholars have communicated that this wariness on the part of the court concerning the
AHRA seemed misplaced because “the Courts have repeatedly held, on the contrary [to
the opinions of Cromwell, Deschamps and LeBel JJ.] that regulatory schemes, including
partial prohibitions, exemptions, licensing regimes and provisions enabling regulatory
controls, can also be valid exercises of [the criminal law] power.”422
In the case of the Ref re AHRA, the trade-off was that the federal government
would infringe upon provincial jurisdiction to allow for the flexibility of a regulatory
framework granted in the form of the AHRA. I agree with McLachlin C.J.’s claim that the
flexibility of a regulatory scheme is essential, particularly when dealing with complex
and novel subject matter.423 However, Graeme G. Mitchell suspected that if the
constitutionality of the impugned provisions within the AHRA were sustained then “it
would mean section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 had truly evolved into the
general regulatory power for the Parliament of Canada.”424 Consequently, I support von
Tigerstrom’s observation that, despite the judicial precedent, it appears that the majority
of the Court was determined to prevent the federal government from playing a significant
role in a domain traditionally reserved for the provinces.425
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Deschamps and LeBel JJ. focused much of their efforts on reviewing the
legislative history and stressing that the AHRA overlapped with provincial jurisdiction.426
The fact that the AHRA infringed upon provincial jurisdiction is not determinative in and
of itself; in addition, the general purpose of the legislation must be considered as well.
Furthermore, as Barbara von Tigerstrom writes, “their reasons do not analyze the content
of the various impugned provisions in much detail, and some of what they say about this
document is not entirely accurate…”427 This observation was supported by Hogg when he
disagreed with Deschamps and LeBel JJ.’s declaration that the impugned provisions of
the AHRA attempted to regulate assisted human reproduction as a ‘health service’.428
Hogg points out that “assisted human reproduction is not a ‘health service’ in any
obvious sense.”429 It is true that the Act applied to some procedures performed by doctors
in hospitals for healthy persons seeking assistance to have children.430 The provisions
within the legislation suggest that the AHRA was meant to regulate highly contentious
areas that exist outside the relationship of doctors and their patients. For example, the Act
also applied to scientists, researchers, technicians, laboratories, clinics, sperm banks,
donors, surrogate mothers, and persons who seek to exploit women and children or who
seek to profit from selling the means to the artificial creation of life.431 I agree that this
function of the AHRA as expressed by Hogg highlights that the legislation was not meant
to only regulate assisted human reproduction as a health service.
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Cromwell J.’s deciding opinion emphasized the fractured nature of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s opinion in the Ref re AHRA. Justice Cromwell stated that sections 8
and 9 of the AHRA were valid criminal law because the issues of consent and age
traditionally fell within the ambit of criminal law.432 However, von Tigerstrom highlights
that those same issues have also been closely regulated in the medical sphere by
provincial legislation.433 Additionally, Cromwell J. maintained the constitutional
legitimacy of section 12 by saying that it relates to and defines the scope of sections 6
and 7.434 He compared these provisions with the other impugned sections of the AHRA,
which he identified as not being “characterized as serving any criminal law purpose
recognized by the Court’s jurisprudence.”435 I agree with Whyte’s claim that, the short
length of Cromwell J.’s opinion did not provide a thorough explanation of his position
and did not explain why he rejected the opinion of McLachlin C.J. that the AHRA was
created for the purposes of protecting health and morality.436
Whyte provided a comment on the Ref re AHRA and listed reasons for the
constitutional challenge. He argued that the more elaborate the administrative scheme for
identifying what is criminal, the less prohibitory it is.437 Administrative frameworks
become more intricate when regulation occurs through an agency that “adopts the
regulatory instruments of investigation, standard setting through regulations, granting
licenses and administrative approvals.”438 At the same time the exercise of administrative
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regulation, when dealing with matters within provincial jurisdiction, will more than likely
duplicate or interfere with processes of administration the provinces are already engaged
in.439 Basically, Whyte’s comments clarified that the complexity of the regulatory
framework as instituted by the AHRA in an area of provincial dominance increased the
probability that the legislation would not be considered constitutionally legitimate by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The fractured opinion rendered in the Ref re AHRA has been criticized for failing
to establish clear guidelines for medical regulation under section 91 (27).440 My view,
however, is that this criticism misses the mark. On the contrary, I agree with Mitchell’s
view that the provisions of the AHRA that in fact survived the reference opinion
demonstrate those actions related to assisted reproduction that fall squarely within the
jurisdiction of the federal government.441 Consequently, and at least with respect to those
actions, the Ref re AHRA does set out clear guidelines. Mitchell explains “Prohibitions of
this kind backed by an offence provision and a penalty clause are the essence of the
criminal law.”442 Second, the Ref re AHRA does not eliminate the constitutional muster of
conditional prohibitions created under section 91 (27). This was exemplified when the
majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA only limited the reach of the controlled activities
section of the Act and not eliminating the section entirely.443 The judicial precedent
before the Ref re AHRA suggested that the courts have tolerated extensive regulatory
regimes provided they were adequately connected to achieving a public health
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objective.444 I agree with Mitchell when he argued that “The degree of constitutionally
acceptable medical regulation under the criminal law power is no longer so openended.”445 The Ref re AHRA restored some balance to the enterprise of utilizing section
91 (27) to justify extensive regulatory schemes in the medical field.446
Unfortunately, the majority opinion of the Ref re AHRA does not provide a clear
example of how to view the minute distinctions present in difficult cases. This is
enhanced by the absence of a clear majority opinion by the Court. The slim decision drew
a line regarding the limits of federal legislation relating to health based on the criminal
law power. The opinion in the Ref re AHRA represents in an area of constitutional law a
shift from a preoccupation with defining what is properly considered criminal law to
reviewing the legislation’s regulatory purpose and its effect on provincial jurisdictions in
order to determine its true constitutional character.447 In other words, this opinion goes
into a realm not previously supported by the jurisprudence. Although the outcome of the
Ref re AHRA has been seen as reasonable, the judicial reasoning supporting the opinion
of the Court did not clarify how to identify distinctions between the federal and
provincial jurisdictions in such an intricate and evolving policy area.448 The general
reaction to the ruling of the Court in the Ref re AHRA was that it was unsatisfying
because of the malleability and uncertainty of the tests employed by the Court regarding
section 91 (27).449 The drastic changes in legal precedent regarding the development of
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the federal government’s criminal law power only enhanced this observation. As Patrick
Monahan and Chanakya Sethi astutely identified, “The case appears to stand for little
more than the proposition that one should check-in again in the future for the Court’s take
on the limits of the criminal law power.”450
I agree with Mitchell’s contention that the majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA
indicated that the Court is moving away from an unbridled acceptance of the federal
criminal law power’s regulatory function.451 However, “the close result achieved in [Ref
re AHRA] means it will be necessary to await other division of powers rulings from the
Supreme Court to assess whether this judgment does mark a watershed in federalism
analysis.”452

7. Implications of the AHRA and Conclusions
The critical analysis surrounding the Ref re AHRA centred upon the division of
powers and the latitude of the federal government’s criminal law power as set out in
section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These discussions have provided insights
into the limits of the criminal law power and how the Ref re AHRA may affect subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. Those who have looked beyond the immediate implications of
the Ref re AHRA have discussed alternatives to litigation and what the demise of many of
the AHRA provisions mean for Canada.
There were a series of factors that contributed to the failure of the impugned
provisions within the AHRA. During the development of the AHRA the United
450
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Kingdom’s status as a world leader in assisted reproductive technology policy, as well as
its system of parliamentary government, made it the ideal policy lender for Canada.453
However, unlike Canada the U.K. is a unitary country and its policy initiatives did not
have to consider the division of powers that are ever-present in a federal system.454
Regardless of these potential jurisdictional issues Canadian policymakers continued to
formulate the AHRA based on the laws of the U.K.455 Once the AHRA was finally passed
in 2004 it was widely considered one of the most comprehensive pieces of reproductive
technology legislation on the planet.456 The Act consisted of both prohibitions and
regulations to enforce the provisions contained within. Although the prohibitions were
considered controversial in terms of policy, there was little doubt that the absolute
prohibitions fell within the jurisdiction of the federal government.457 This is supported
further because the constitutionality of the prohibitions was not challenged at the Quebec
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada.
In comparison, the Act’s regulatory provisions were often seen as infringing upon
the provincial jurisdiction over healthcare. From the outset opposition party leaders
expressed their displeasure with the regulatory provisions of the AHRA. Although the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Health in 2001 advocated for a “single
regulatory regime encompassing one set of standards and one set of penalties… with no
exceptions”, opposition members continued to question the scope of the AHRA.458 The
Bloc Quebecois urged co-ordination and co-operation between the federal and provincial
453
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governments because large areas of assisted human reproduction fell within provincial
jurisdiction.459 The Progressive Conservatives aggressively maintained that the provinces
and territories should be involved in the drafting of the AHRA, while the Canadian
Alliance expressed the view that without provincial input parts of the legislation would
be susceptible to constitutional scrutiny.460
From the beginning numerous political actors warned of the consequences of such
an intricate piece of federal legislation with little to no provincial participation. After the
Baird Commission published its final report Proceed with Care, proponents of the AHRA
grew impatient with constitutional courtesies.461 Diane Marleau, the federal Minister of
Health during much of the legislative drafting, acknowledged that assisted reproductive
technologies tended to be in provincial jurisdiction. However, Marleau and other
supporters of the AHRA felt that assisted reproduction posed controversial questions
regarding the health of women and well-being of children born as a result of assisted
reproductive methods.462 The drafters of the Act believed that urgent action was needed in
order to regulate this field and that suitable regulation could be achieved with the creation
of one single piece of centralized federal legislation.463 This outlook was reflected in
Proceed with Care when the Baird Commission rejected the notion that new reproductive
technologies should continue to be subdivided into component parts and left to the
provincial legislatures.464
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By the late 1990’s there was an increased sense of urgency to draft and pass
legislation related to assisted reproduction. Jones and Salter documented that because of
how high the stakes had become, the shaping of the AHRA came as a result of numerous
compromises made by various parties involved in the formulation of the legislation.465 It
has been widely held that those involved with the AHRA made concessions in order to
have the Act passed so that there would be some sort of a regulatory framework in place
related to assisted reproduction technologies.466 The lack of a regulatory framework in
Canada “was leaving it open for clinicians and researchers to practice, without guidance
or restriction, those controversial activities which later became prohibited or controlled
under the Act.”467 Although compromise amongst stakeholders did not come easily, all
could agree that some sort of a legislative framework was preferred over nothing at all.
The overriding theme of the legislative process leading up to the passing of the AHRA
was therefore that many individuals involved with the legislation in a number of
capacities fast tracked the legislation and ignored the numerous risks related to the
constitutionality of the Act. As shown in the majority opinion of the Ref re AHRA these
short cuts proved to be the AHRA’s undoing.
The result of the Ref re AHRA leaves the regulatory void to be filled by the
provinces in many areas of assisted reproductive technologies.468 And as Hogg declared,
“As a matter of policy, the result is unfortunate.”469 It is critical to recognize that at the
time the Supreme Court of Canada issued its majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA, only
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one province had enacted a statute to regulate assisted human reproduction.470 The
Quebec National Assembly passed An Act respecting clinical and research activities
relating to assisted procreation on June 9, 2009.471 The statute, commonly referred to as
the Assisted Procreation Act, was passed only after Quebec issued the reference question
to challenge the federal Act.472 It seems as though the remaining provinces continue to be
disenchanted with the notion of allocating resources towards the creation of provincial
legislation concerning assisted reproduction. This observation is supported by Hogg’s
statement that “None of the other provinces had sought to regulate the field and six
provinces did not even intervene in the reference.”473 Furthermore, I agree with Hogg’s
claim that “It seems likely that in some provinces there will be no legislation, and
therefore no regulatory oversight of practices that may be unsafe for the mother or the
eventual offspring.”474 Individuals desperate to have biological children may be
undeterred by these risks and attracted to the provinces that currently or in the future
offer assisted reproductive services.475 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has
ruled out the solution of a comprehensive national regime presented by the federal
government in the form of the AHRA. All the same, it is possible that the disinterest
demonstrated by the other provinces may be reduced due to the continued presence of
Quebec’s assisted reproduction legislation. In other words, the remaining provinces may
be inspired and use the Quebec statute as a legislative template when drafting their own
laws related to assisted reproduction. But even this is not guaranteed. For the sun may be
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setting on Quebec’s Assisted Procreation Act, since as of August 5, 2013 the Minister of
Health and Social and Services must report to the Quebec provincial legislature regarding
the implementation of the legislation and on the advisability of maintaining it in force or
amending it.476
Regardless of the fate that awaits the Assisted Procreation Act in Quebec the
federal government deserves some credit for attempting to address the legislative vacuum
that was present in the field of assisted reproductive technologies prior to the creation of
the AHRA. Although the scope of the AHRA was severely limited following the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court some important features remain. Most notably, the absolute
prohibitions that survived the Ref re AHRA still continue to be enforced by Health
Canada. These enduring prohibitions will be enforced by Health Canada because the
Canadian federal government announced that it would oversee the closure of operations
of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC) by March 31, 2013.477
Some analysts have viewed the closing of the AHRC as a disaster regarding the
regulation of assisted reproduction legislation.478 In contrast, I agree with Dave Snow and
Rainer Knopff when they stated “the claim that the Supreme Court ruling created a new
regulatory void is exaggerated because Assisted Human Reproduction Canada did
virtually nothing in the way of monitoring or regulation.”479 For example, between April
2004 and December 2010, only one of the 30 regulations anticipated in the AHRA was
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introduced by the AHRC.480 Health Canada explained it was delaying the introduction of
the AHRA regulations because it was awaiting the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Ref re AHRA.481 Also, between 2004 and 2012 there was only one reported
RCMP investigation into alleged violations of the prohibitions set out in the AHRA.482 As
for the AHRC’s responsibility to license clinics that perform controlled activities
stipulated in the AHRA, no fertility clinic was ever granted a license by the AHRC.483
These examples provide clear evidence that the AHRC failed to promote compliance and
enforce the provisions of the federal Act. Although, it must be recognized that the
protracted litigation associated with the AHRA drastically limited the operations of the
AHRC. Still, the inaction of the AHRC demonstrates how in theory the AHRA had the
potential to revolutionize assisted reproduction technology policy in Canada, but in
practice the provisions were under utilized and rendered relatively ineffective.
With the limitations placed upon the AHRA following the constitutional
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada it is important to encourage the Canadian
provinces to draft legislation that regulates assisted reproduction. The majority opinion in
the Ref re AHRA effectively dismantled Parliament’s unilateral attempt to institute a
national framework capable of regulating the area of assisted human reproduction.
However, I agree with Graeme G. Mitchell that it is still possible “to achieve panCanadian standards in the regulation of assisted human reproduction technologies.”484 I
would propose that inter-governmental co-operation might result in new and innovative
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ways to address the need for a cohesive national framework. I agree with Mitchell’s view
that the creation of a unified national scheme would “require forbearance by the federal
government and a willingness to cooperate by provincial governments.”485 In addition,
Mitchell advises the provincial governments to address the legislative absence currently
present in the field of assisted reproduction.486 Again, provinces have been reluctant to
legislate in this area, but the opinion communicated in the Ref re AHRA should reduce
this level of cautiousness. Mitchell was correct to warn that if the provinces continue to
refuse to legislate in this burgeoning and important medical field, the provinces may be
compelled to act if future cases arise concerning assisted human reproduction that expose
legislative shortcomings.487 I concur with both Mitchell and Hogg that litigation is a
protracted and expensive method to attain desired objectives and at times it fails to
achieve the best policy outcomes.488 Similarly, awaiting directives from the judiciary is
not only time consuming and expensive, but also is highly inefficient and has the
propensity to heighten inter-governmental tensions. Anticipating judicial decisions is
wasteful and removes the accountability of policy choices from the legislatures and
relocates these decisions into the hands of the judiciary. Abiding by the tenets of cooperative federalism can potentially eliminate the need for judicial review in some cases,
keeping policy decisions in the hands of elected officials and away from the appointed
judiciary.
The population size and economic capabilities possessed by certain provinces,
namely Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, may allow these provinces to
485

Mitchell, supra note 296 at 667.
Ibid.
487
Ibid at 668.
488
Mitchell, supra note 296 at 669; Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-45.
486

102

allocate resources towards the drafting of assisted reproduction technology statutes.
However, not all provinces may feel they possess the administrative competency to
adequately regulate the countless issues associated with assisted reproduction. These
uncertainties should not discourage future attempts to institute a national framework. I
support the opinion of Mitchell that “There is a way to achieve this goal [of a national
scheme] which is consistent with the robust concept of co-operative federalism espoused
by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years.”489 Mitchell proposes that the use of the
co-operative federalism concept can result in administrative inter-delegation.
Administrative inter-delegation occurs when both levels of government wilfully delegate
administrative responsibilities to a national agency. In Federation des producteurs de
volailles du Quebec v. Pelland (2005) it was described that in order for administrative
inter-delegation to be effective it would require each level of government to enact laws
and regulations based on “their respective legislative competencies, to create a unified
and coherent regulatory scheme…”490 Such inter-delegation to a single national agency
by provincial and the federal governments of their respective jurisdictional powers in
relation to a particular area of concentration has long been accepted by the Supreme
Court.491 Once these laws are ratified by each level of government the administration of
this scheme could be afforded to a single regulatory agency created by Parliament.492
The Assisted Procreation Act enacted by Quebec is in place and can serve as a
model for other provinces. The administration of all the provisions contained within each
potential provincial statute can then be delegated to a single national body responsible for
489
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enforcing the national scheme. This arrangement “would permit national standards to be
achieved yet also take into account local initiatives and values.”493 Although it is true that
the Ref re AHRA seriously limited the capabilities of the AHRA to regulate sophisticated
medical technologies, it does not prevent governments from accessing creative yet
constitutionally acceptable solutions to achieving the formation of a national regulatory
body responsible for overseeing activities related to assisted reproduction.
The solutions proposed by Mitchell would be possible if the federal and
provincial governments were to engage in co-operative federalism. Furthermore, these
solutions would eliminate the necessity in some situations for governments to appeal to
the judiciary. But the presence of a legislative vacuum pushed policymakers to draft a
constitutionally precarious piece of legislation. The threat of a legislative vacuum in such
a controversial and evolving policy domain may have caused the legislative drafters to
overlook the value that inter-governmental co-operation could have brought to the AHRA.
This may have been because the policy makers did not believe that the provinces were
willing or capable of reaching an agreement on an issue that was morally, socially, and
politically controversial in nature. As highlighted above, opposition members frequently
endorsed co-ordination between governments. The result of the Ref re AHRA proved that
the constitutional gamble taken by those involved in the creation of AHRA did not pay
off. Various political figures, academics and commentators writing both before and after
the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in the Ref re AHRA discussed the enormous value
inter-governmental co-operation could bestow upon the Act.
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Recall that at the core of co-operative federalism is a network of relationships that
exist between the executives of the central and regional governments. Through these
relationships inter-governmental mechanisms are created which allow for the constant
redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts or constitutional
amendment. The development of the AHRA and the subsequent judicial saga culminating
in the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA is an example of
political actors failing to adhere to the tenets of co-operative federalism. In this situation,
both the federal and provincial governments failed to abide by the principles of cooperative federalism therefore both levels of government must shoulder some of the
blame. Contrary to the views of the opposition parties, it seems the federal government
did not adequately consult the provinces while the AHRA was being developed.494
Moreover, the prolonged litigation process was initiated by the Government of Quebec
and the decision to appeal to the judiciary contravened the primary goals of co-operative
federalism. Regardless of the legislative vacuum being addressed with the passing of the
AHRA, I would suggest that the Act was seen as expendable by Quebec, especially once
the Assisted Procreation Act was being drafted and on its way to being passed.
Furthermore, Quebec’s political leaders may have viewed assisted reproduction as a topic
that was on the fringes of society’s central social and economic concerns. As a result, the
Quebec government may have thought that laws drafted in the provincial legislature
would adequately address any perceived concerns related to assisted human reproduction
legislation. In sum, it appears the province of Quebec did not share the same sentiments
of the federal government that viewed the AHRA as an indispensable piece of health
legislation.
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Numerous academics and legal commentators have endorsed the concept of cooperative federalism as an option to adequately regulate assisted human reproductive
technologies. This would suggest that in this case there is scholarly support for promoting
co-operative federalism as an efficient substitute for judicial review. That is not to say
that the involvement of the judiciary is not valuable, as in some cases litigation is
unavoidable. The reality is that in some situations there may not be an agreement that can
be reached between governments. However, I would argue that when possible, appeals to
the judiciary should be considered only if extended inter-governmental negotiations are
unsuccessful. Greater inter-governmental negotiation and consultation is needed when
creating complex policy in an emerging field like assisted human reproduction. I endorse
the notion that if inter-governmental interactions were to abide by the tenets of cooperative federalism legislation would be less susceptible to the long and expensive
process of judicial review. In other words, if there is greater inter-governmental
negotiation through the utilization of co-operative federalism during the drafting of
legislation it is possible that laws can be endorsed by both levels of government. More
consultation may lead to statutes that are accepted by both levels of government and thus
less likely to be constitutionally challenged. This notion of laws being supported by both
levels of government is at the centre of both co-operative federalism and its counter-part
competitive federalism. Regardless, both concepts attempted to achieve the same goal
albeit through different methods. The objective was to introduce a framework that would
allow statutes to be supported by both levels of government.
In the end, many lessons can be learned from the failings of the AHRA if one
heeds the advice of the Supreme Court of Canada, various legal commentators and
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constitutional scholars. My view is that a possible solution to the difficulties encountered
during the legislative saga surrounding the AHRA is greater inter-governmental coordination, consultation and negotiation as endorsed by the concept of co-operative
federalism. In addition, I would go so far as to say that the applicability of the concept
transcends this case and can be applied to others. As demonstrated throughout this project
inter-governmental co-operative interaction – that is, co-operative federalism – makes it
possible for governments to utilize creative constitutional processes such as
administrative inter-delegation to achieve complex policy objectives including a national
regulatory framework. Furthermore, it is possible to avoid unnecessary litigation, create
widely accepted legislation and minimize inter-governmental tensions through the use of
co-operative federalism. In the end, then, within the confines of Canada’s current
constitutional structure, co-operative federalism is the best way to manage tensions and
increase efficiency within the Canadian Federation, while negating the presence of
unnecessary litigation before the courts.
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